CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.491
2 March 1989

ENGLISH

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 2 March 1989, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Chusei Yamada (Japan)

The PRESIDENT: The 491st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is now called to order.

As Japan assumes the presidency for the month of March, my Prime Minister has asked me to convey a message to the Conference which I would like to read. I quote:

"Japan has the honour to assume the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament during this month, nearly seven years after it last held the post of the then Committee on Disarmament in April 1982.

"Recent years have witnessed marked improvements in the international climate surrounding bilateral relations as well as regional and multilateral issues. These trends give us a sustained hope that the priority objectives of the Conference on Disarmament, to which the Government and people of Japan continue to attach high importance, will become a reality.

"Such attainment requires, no doubt, patient and continuing efforts on the part of all member States to bridge the differences and to widen the areas of convergence. The very success of the recent Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons has demonstrated that it is indeed possible to obtain concrete results, when such efforts are made. Our mission is to make steady progress, building upon those successes as in chemical weapons and other important areas of disarmament.

"Japan is firmly committed to this worthy endeavour, and pledges to fulfil in all sincerity its heavy responsibility of the stewardship of the Conference at this important juncture.

"I extend my very best wishes to all delegates and earnestly hope for success in your undertakings."

This concludes the message.

I wish to pay a tribute of praise to my predecessor, Ambassador Puqliese of Italy. The month of February is an important month to set the course for our work during the whole year. Ambassador Pugliese, who presided during this crucial period, performed a marvellous task. Under his able leadership we can embark in our assignments with new determination. I would like to thank him also for the kind words and good wishes he addressed to me at the last plenary session. My task is to follow in his footsteps. May I ask for your kind co-operation so that I can fulfil my duty during the month of March.

This afternoon the Conference is honoured with the presence of two dignitaries. They are His Excellency Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, and His Excellency Mr. Giulio Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy. The Vice-Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Foreign Minister of Italy have been playing key roles in multilateral disarmament. We had the privilege of listening to their

(The President)

addresses in our session last year as well as at the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, and, as recently as in January, the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The importance of their visit is enhanced in particular because it takes place at a time when the conference is engaged in an intensive negotiating effort to achieve a comprehensive chemical weapons ban. The two statesmen represent countries which have always played a significant role in the Conference through the well-known contributions of their delegations to our daily work. We are indeed grateful to them for their personal interest in the work of the Conference, and I wish to extend a most cordial welcome.

I now call upon his Excellency Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, to address the Conference.

Mr. GENSCHER (Federal Republic of Germany) (translated from German): At this time of dynamic developments in the field of disarmament and arms control, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament has also acquired increased tasks and responsibility for ensuring the maintenance and safeguarding of peace world-wide. My friend Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti of Italy and I have decided to appear here jointly again in order to underscore the great importance attaching to this Conference as the global negotiating forum for arms control and disarmament. Above all, this Conference has the task of freeing mankind as quickly as possible from the threat of chemical weapons by concluding a convention that completely bans chemical weapons world-wide.

You, Mr. President, are known as an experienced and circumspect diplomat versed in multilateral disarmament negotiations. I wish you every success in your responsible post, and assure you of my delegation's support. May your presidency bring about a successful and decisive session.

The conditions for this are good. In many parts of the world, conflicts are now being defused, tensions eliminated, and confrontation replaced by agreed settlements. This dynamic peace process is made possible by no longer thinking in terms of confrontation and rivalry. Instead new thinking predicated on responsibility and co-operation is gaining the upper hand. This gives cause for optimism and confidence. But it should not prompt us to be complacent. We are all faced with global challenges. The effects of the North-South conflict and the consequences of the debt burden are problems confronting the whole of mankind. The destruction of the environment, of rain forests and of the ozone layer poses a threat to us all. Only jointly can we safeguard our future; everyone must participate in this undertaking. We are united in the quest for survival. Mankind has come to realize this.

These new recognitions also extend to the sphere of disarmament and arms control. New, co-operative thinking in West and East is beginning to prevail in this field, too. The reduction of military arsenals has at last become a real possibility. In the case of American and Soviet land-based intermediate-range systems people throughout the world are witnessing the elimination of an entire class of weapons. This is accompanied by unprecedented and exemplary rules of verification.

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

The Stockholm Document and the INF Treaty mark a historic turning point. The breakthrough in the INF sector must now be followed by progress in the other areas of disarmament and arms control. Never before have the conditions been as favourable for disarmament and arms control. The completion of the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting opens up new avenues to a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. Europe has the chance to create an exemplary order marked by a new political quality, collaboration and co-operative security. We must set standards of coexistence that have effects reaching beyond our continent.

In Vienna, the way has now been paved for two new sets of arms control negotiations. The aim of the negotiations on conventional forces is to achieve stability at a significantly lower level of armaments. It must be ensured that neither side is able to launch surprise attacks or large-scale offensives, which we for our part are already unable to do. In view of the existing disparities, equilibrium at a significantly lower level can only be achieved through asymmetrical disarmament. This means that the Eastern side must make larger disarmament steps than us. The unilateral reductions announced by the Soviet Union and subsequently by other members of the Warsaw Pact are important steps in the right direction, which we welcome. They do not eliminate the existing imbalances, but they show that the East is seriously seeking to move in the direction of Western ideas on conventional disarmament.

Confidence is a precondition of disarmament. Confidence is the product of openness and predictability. For this reason, the other forum established in Vienna for negotiations on new confidence-building measures in Europe is important. Neither weapons nor weapons reductions can on their own guarantee peace and stability. Lasting security presupposes that the two sides agree on the philosophies underlying their defence. In the forthcoming negotiations we therefore intend to achieve a common understanding to the effect that military forces should only exist to prevent war and ensure self-defence, not for the purpose of military aggression and not for the purposes of political or military intimidation.

In this nuclear age, a responsible security policy must be guided by the recognition that mankind can survive only through joint efforts. As realists, we are aware that today's security must not be based on visions and expectations for tomorrow. But as men of action as policy makers living up to their responsibility for the future, we must today develop perspectives for future security and lay foundations that are broader, firmer and stronger than those on which peace has rested until now. Over the net of deterrence by nuclear and conventional means as the final resort, we must spread an additional net which reduces the risks resulting from exclusive reliance on military deterrence. This requires the creation of reliable and co-operative security structures not only in Europe, but world-wide. Wherever disarmament and arms control are at issue in the world, it must be borne in mind that confidence-building paves the way to more disarmament. And disarmament in turn generates confidence. Let us set in motion this spiral of reason world-wide.

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

The INF Treaty has initiated a process which must become irreversible. Other steps must soon follow. The countries not possessing nuclear weapons will not allow the nuclear-weapon States to evade their commitment to nuclear disarmament, which they assumed before the rest of the world in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The constructive continuation and early successful completion of the United States-Soviet START negotiations are urgently needed for ensuring strategic stability at a lower level. The remaining gaps in the field of nuclear arms control must be closed. For this reason, we consider negotiations on short-range nuclear systems, as decided in the Western Alliance at Reykjavik in 1987, to be a top priority. We call for negotiations on these systems to be started without delay in accordance with the Reykjavik decisions; there are no reasonable grounds for not initiating such negotiations. We welcome the Soviet Union's readiness for negotiations of this kind. What we need are not firebreaks against new disarmament negotiations, but firebreaks to prevent an unbridled arms race. The Soviet Union, which has a great superiority in the field of short-range nuclear systems, could facilitate promising disarmament negotiations by offers of unilateral disarmament.

A Convention wholly banning biological weapons has existed since 1972. A shortcoming of his Convention is the lack of verification rules. I would therefore like to announce at this stage that at the third review conference in 1991 my Government will advocate adequate verification measures to supplement the Convention. I call upon all countries that have not yet done so to sign the Convention prohibiting biological weapons.

Mr. President, the most urgent contribution to disarmament expected of this Conference by the world is the elimination of a particularly cruel and insidious category of weapons of mass destruction: chemical weapons. In this respect, the multilateral disarmament process on a global scale is facing a crucial test. A year ago, I emphasized here, together with my colleague Mr. Andreotti from Italy, that the global, comprehensive and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons is a matter of the greatest urgency. Above all, we warned of the risk of proliferation of chemical weapons. Meanwhile it has become painfully clear how right that assessment was. The shock caused by the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf war led to the international community, on the suggestion of the American President and at the invitation of President Mitterrand, holding a conference in Paris on the prohibition of chemical weapons. At the Paris Conference high-level representatives from 149 countries jointly sought ways and means of putting an end to the use and spread of chemical weapons. The international community was at one in condemning chemical weapons. This permitted consensus on the Final Declaration of Paris, which demanded the early conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons. We must now do justice to that call here in Geneva. Everyone's words must be followed by deeds.

In Paris, the recognition that only a comprehensive and global ban can solve the problem of chemical weapons gained considerable ground. As long as there are no peremptory rules of international law prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of chemical weapons, the risk of their unlawful use will persist. As long as national export controls

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remain the only legal instrument for preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons, it will not be possible to rule out reliably any misuse of chemical substances and equipment allegedly supplied for peaceful purposes. As long as there is no international monitoring system that permits systematic on-site inspections at short notice, it will be hard to dispel any suspicion of the clandestine development and production of chemical weapons. And as long as the arsenals of chemical weapons are not eliminated world-wide, it will be almost impossible to obtain a voluntary renunciation of the capacity for chemical warfare, especially in areas of crisis.

More and more countries are trying to acquire with foreign assistance the capability for producing chemical weapons. Foreign companies, and unfortunately German ones as well, supply components and chemical precursors or provide the requisite know-how. The alarming proliferation of chemical weapons confronts all countries with a grave responsibility that no government can shirk. Particularly for our country this is a deeply moral matter, which directly affects the identity and credibility of our State.

The Federal Republic of Germany has renounced the production and use of chemical weapons through an internationally binding pledge. It is the only country thus far to subject its chemical industry to regular on-site inspections by an international agency. We consider it our duty to do everything humanly possible to prevent the participation of German companies and individuals in the production of these terrible weapons in other countries. Such participation is a crime and must be treated and punished as such. The laws and controls will be tightened. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has therefore responded to the recent occurrences with a series of measures, of which I would like to mention the main ones:

Firstly, we shall extend the authorization requirements for the export of technical documents and know-how. In future, the export of production and other technological documents, as well as the transfer of not generally accessible technical know-how to other countries in the world, will require authorization in all instances. Secondly, the authorization requirements for the export of precursors of chemical weapons will be extended from 8 to 17 substances. This will apply to exports to all countries without exception. Thirdly, it will be made obligatory, even before any export, to notify the production of equipment capable of being used for the purposes of chemical weapons. Fourthly, the criminal provisions governing violations of foreign trade and payments legislation are being tightened. Penalties of up to five years' imprisonment may be imposed. Fifthly, new provisions are being introduced which make it punishable for Germans to assist - in whatever manner, be it at home or abroad - in the production of chemical weapons facilities or the development and manufacture of chemical or biological weapons. This offence will be subject to not less than 2 and up to 15 years' imprisonment.

On 20 February of this year, the Council of Ministers of the European Community adopted on my initiative a regulation under article 113 of the EC Treaty which subjects to authorization the export of eight chemical substances suitable as precursors of chemical weapons. Our aim is to achieve

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consensus within the European Community on considerably expanding this list so as to achieve the most comprehensive instrument possible for preventing the spread of precursors of chemical weapons. We are also striving together with our partners in European political co-operation to introduce mandatory authorization with regard to the export of facilities and equipment suited to the production of chemical weapons. It is our aim that such an agreement should as soon as possible be made binding on all 19 countries united in the "Australia Group". I appeal to the bodies that I have just mentioned to accord the highest priority to these measures. Every effort must be made to ensure that the chemical weapons production facilities now under construction are not completed.

However, on no account must we succumb to the illusion that national and international measures can effectively prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons, though such measures are at present greatly needed because this Conference has not yet concluded a convention fully banning chemical weapons world-wide. There is no alternative to a comprehensive, global and effectively verifiable convention which prohibits without restriction the development, production, possession, acquisition, transfer and use of chemical weapons and brings about the complete destruction of existing chemical weapons stocks under international supervision. The risk of proliferation will grow as long as this legal vacuum persists. It arouses the desire of those who do not possess chemical weapons. I strongly warn against confining the fight against chemical weapons to measures designed to prevent their spread. Such an approach would undermine the determination of the international community to effectively ban chemical weapons through a global, comprehensive convention.

On 18 April 1984 President Bush, then still Vice-President of the United States, rightly stated at this very Conference: "The essence of verification is deterrence of violations through the risk of detection." A global ban will only be effective if it is verifiable. In the matter of verifiability, especially in challenge inspections, the security interests of mankind must take precedence over the economic interests of companies that are worried about their business secrets. This must not be the hour of the pusillanimous who encumber the substance of the negotiations with more and more technical and legal problems and describe the verification issues as unsolvable. Time is pressing! The negotiations of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament on a convention that prohibits chemical weapons world-wide must therefore be brought to a successful conclusion at last.

In the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference, the countries participating in this Conference here were called on "to redouble their efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date". This signal from Paris must be translated into practice here in Geneva. This imposes a duty on all negotiating delegations in this forum and on the Governments they represent. I wish Ambassador Morel as the new Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons every success in his new responsible post. I would also like to thank his predecessor, Ambassador Sujka, for his dedicated and purposeful conduct of the negotiations in 1988.

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

I share the expectation of the United Nations Secretary-General that the commitment expressed at such a high level in Paris will expedite the negotiations here. It is possible to solve the problems still obstructing the conclusion of a convention by the end of this year. This also applies to the subject of verification. The Final Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, as well as the United States-Soviet INF Treaty, opened the door to a world in which systematic checks and mandatory challenge inspections play a natural confidence-building function. In the efforts towards chemical disarmament, too, the technical complexities of the verification issue must not become a pretext for deferring the solution of what is essentially a political problem.

As the outcome of many years of work by this Conference, an advanced draft convention is available, which also contains the fundamentals of a comprehensive verification régime. However, over the years this text has become more and more complicated. Some points are unclear or ambiguous, as inevitably results from different views at a particular time. It is now essential to consolidate the draft where consensus has already been achieved on substantive issues and, at the same time, to find suitable solutions to those questions still in abeyance.

During this year's round of negotiations, we must succeed in solving the main problems involved in the envisaged verification régime. While chairing the new Working Group on verification, my delegation will make special efforts to bring about consensual solutions to the outstanding verification issues. Above all, two important questions concerning the verification of a chemical weapons convention, namely the monitoring of non-production of chemical weapons and challenge inspections, have yet to be resolved. One of the most difficult tasks is that of reliably monitoring the chemical industry. It must be ensured that the permitted production of substances which are also suitable as precursors of chemical weapons exclusively serves peaceful purposes. This Conference has developed a graduated monitoring system to that end.

To supplement the measures already discussed for monitoring non-production, my delegation introduced during the last round of negotiations a concept for additional inspections at short notice in the form of ad hoc checks applicable to the entire chemical industry. With the aid of a simple analytical procedure, it is to be established whether any prohibited or undeclared substances are being manufactured at the time of the inspection. Such ad hoc checks are intended to supplement routine inspections and can be carried out without time-consuming, excessive interference with production processes. This new flexible instrument offers clear-cut advantages for the verification of a chemical weapons convention: even if there is no suspicion, the entire chemical industry is accessible to the inspectorate. With the aid of simple, scarcely intrusive checks, a high degree of transparency is achieved in what is at present a grey area. Therefore, these ad hoc checks ought to be acceptable to everyone.

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However, mandatory challenge inspections remain indispensable as the main means of obtaining certainty in a specific case as to whether the convention is being complied with. They permit swift clarification in any case involving serious concern about security. This problem should be tackled as a matter of priority. The associated political and technical difficulties are well known but confidence-building, protection against violations of the convention and the protection of human life and dignity must take precedence. Absolutely nothing can justify the rejection of mandatory challenge inspections, and certainly not the business interests of individual companies.

Even before the convention is concluded, practical experience should be gathered so that its verification provisions can be made as realistic and effective as possible. We have therefore unreservedly welcomed the suggestion of trial inspections and have, like various other countries, declared our readiness to undergo such inspections. A few weeks ago, the Federal Republic of Germany carried out its first trial inspection in the form of a routine inspection at a facility of the civilian chemical industry. The results were encouraging. Our experience has convinced us that it is possible with the aid of routine inspections to ensure adequate monitoring of the non-production of prohibited substances.

As with routine inspections, we expect practical trials of ad hoc checks to yield important information. We are, therefore, at present preparing a trial inspection in the form of an ad hoc check at a major chemical plant. The chemical industry is receptive to this new verification instrument and its testing. We shall report in detail on the experience we gain. The exchange of experience here in Geneva on all national trial inspections will provide important information on how to improve the verification rules. It will also lay the basis for international trial inspections, which we shall gladly participate in. The German chemical industry will also make a plant available for that purpose.

The national or international trial inspections carried out or envisaged in many countries also reflect the growing openness and co-operation of countries in the field of chemical disarmament. This creates a new dimension of confidence, which is beneficial for the negotiations on a verifiable chemical weapons convention. The aim must be to achieve such a degree of monitoring that it is not possible for anyone to manufacture and stockpile militarily significant quantities of chemical weapons without being discovered.

We must reach agreement soon if we are to live up to our common responsibility for putting an end once and for all to the atrocities of chemical warfare. Given good will on the part of everyone concerned, this ought to be possible by the end of this year. I appeal to the world's scientists to refuse to participate in the development and production of these terrible weapons of mass destruction. I therefore address this urgent appeal to the Governments of the countries represented here: for the purpose of definitively eliminating these weapons, let us demonstrate maximum commitment, creativity and readiness for compromise. Let us make every effort to arrive as soon as possible at a convention that is ready for signature. We must not shatter the hopes of our nations. We must not cause the process of

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disarmament, which is now under way on a broad basis, to founder on this decisive threshold. We all know that there are still difficult problems to be solved. But at this advanced stage, invoking those problems can no longer serve as a pretext for relaxing our efforts.

We must do everything possible to ensure at an early stage that countries which are not members of this Conference are suitably informed and become involved where appropriate. We must avoid a situation where, after this Conference has completed its work, individual countries refuse to accede to the convention on the grounds that they had insufficient opportunities to participate in drafting it. The requisite globality of the convention presupposes that the opportunities for participation open to all countries are actually used. We should therefore encourage all interested countries to take part as observers in the meetings of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I expressly welcome the representatives of those countries who already perform this important task, and especially this session's newcomers.

Mr. President, we are in a position where we can make the vision of a world without chemical weapons become reality. You may rest assured that my delegation will continue to contribute actively to this endeavour. The obstacles on the path to a convention banning chemical weapons can now be surmounted. This lofty goal merits our full commitment. It is my most fervent wish that this Conference will prove an unqualified success.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany for his important contribution to the work of the Conference. In my capacity as the representative of Japan I would like to express our sincere gratitude to His Excellency for personally participating in representing your Government at the funeral of His late Majesty last week. I would also like to thank His Excellency for the very kind words you addressed to me.

I now call upon His Excellency Mr. Giulio Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, to address the Conference.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (Italy) (translated from Italian): I am particularly pleased to address this gathering again, one year on, together with my friend, Mr. Genscher. The year has not passed in vain: in fact, the prospects for hope and peace have been reinforced.

Some of the most serious crises bequeathed to us by the previous decade seem to be gradually coming to an end, or at least their gravity seems to be decreasing. In the most bloody conflict of all, in the Gulf, a truce, although precarious, has been agreed upon. It is up to the two parties to bridge the gap still separating them from a veritable and durable peace. In Afghanistan the withdrawal of Soviet troops has removed one of the main obstacles to the solution of the crisis, but has also opened a phase of extreme uncertainty. Our commitment, the commitment of the European Community countries, is that of following the events carefully and providing our own political and material support for a peaceful transition.

(Mr. Andreotti, Italy)

Dialogue is continuing between the United States and the Soviet Union, substantially uninterrupted by the change of Administration in Washington. Following the entry into force of their agreement of 8 December 1987, we witnessed the elimination of a first contingent of highly sophisticated instruments of death, and this underlines even more clearly the innovative, I would even say revolutionary, nature of the agreement.

The CSCE Conference in Vienna has set new, historic and demanding goals in terms of security, human rights and freedom of expression and communication. In a very few days, negotiations will begin on conventional armed forces in Europe and confidence-building measures, which will be extremely important for the prospects of enhanced stability at decreasing levels of forces and for a gradual restructuring of all military deployments in accordance with defensive criteria.

Finally, the results of the Paris Conference of 7-11 January have vindicated the initiative taken by Mr. Genscher and myself in February 1988, when we pressed for a general commitment to intensified negotiations on a total ban on this kind of weapon. In Paris, we realized that the concerns we had expressed on that occasion were broadly shared by the international community. From that Conference, which was attended by practically every country in the world, there emerged a generalized rejection of chemical weapons and a firm commitment on the part of everyone to give a further boost to negotiations on a convention which would not only ban their use, but at last prohibit their development, production, possession and very existence.

Let us seize on this favourable opportunity that the political situation is offering us, which we may never be offered again, to stave off for ever the scourge of war in its most devastating forms. The Paris Conference reaffirmed the role of the United Nations and gave it renewed vigour, strengthening its monitoring powers and its political and moral authority which no one will wish to evade. It is now necessary to set up the procedures that will allow the Secretary-General to promptly and effectively act in the face of future allegations on the use of chemical weapons. The outcome of the Paris Conference will be measured above all in terms of your work. Hence the additional responsibility of this institution, which has to pursue concrete objectives in relation to peace and stability by proceeding towards the elimination of a whole class of weapons, as has already been done in the case of intermediate-range missiles.

Over-estimation of the requirements of one's own security hinders disarmament, while an imperfect knowledge of the capabilities and intentions of the other side fuels suspicion and mistrust. This is the main reason why it is so difficult to solve intricate problems in an area where the risk of violating commitments is increased by the many connections that exist between civilian production and potential military uses. Italy is endeavouring to enhance the role of the international scientific community, precisely to help solve the problems relating to verification and transparency.

(Mr. Andreotti, Italy)

We are firmly persuaded that only a global solution can root out the growing risk of proliferation of weapons which are not only deadly, but also hideous, in a context of rigorous verifiability that will deter violations. Italy neither possesses nor intends to develop chemical weapons, and does not host them on her soil. Our commitment to the rapid establishment of conditions which will persuade all countries to resolutely and effectively reject them, in line with the conclusions of the Paris Conference, is therefore all the more credible.

One of the main objectives, in our opinion, is the rapid neutralization of all existing stockpiles and production facilities. Their destruction should begin as soon as the future convention comes into force, at a faster pace in the case of the largest arsenals. I also believe that the storage depots and production plants should be immediately made subject to rigorous international monitoring, pending their total elimination.

All of us have appreciated the willingness of the Soviet Union to unilaterally begin the destruction of its large quantities of chemical weapons; our only regret is that this decision had not been taken earlier - for example, before the United States resumed production of such weapons after an interval of 17 years. We view the Soviet initiative, which in due course will have to be channelled into the verification procedures provided under the future convention, as a step in the right direction, to which the other great Power will certainly not remain insensitive.

We have already supplied information on Italy's production of substances relevant to the convention, and we are ready to participate in a wider and even more detailed and exhaustive exchange of data. Until a total ban is imposed, we are also willing to adopt further measures to check the export of chemicals that could be used for military purposes, as well as appropriate sanctions. Italian legislation is in fact one of the strictest in this regard. The more advanced industrial countries are duty-bound to act rigorously and consistently and co-ordinate their actions. We have stressed this need in multilateral forums, such as the Western European Union and the European Community.

We have also promoted a trial inspection in some Italian chemical plants by an international group of scientists, whose findings have just been made available to this institution. For this reason too, it is satisfying to note that the experimental method was recommended at the end of the most recent session of the Conference on Disarmament.

The countries most concerned, which certainly include Italy, could also promote and co-ordinate scientific initiatives that will help to settle the still unresolved issues in the negotiation; gather and disseminate useful information for effective implementation of the ban; and co-ordinate possible initiatives taken by the industrial associations of different countries in this particular field in order to increase public awareness of the risks proliferation entails.

(Mr. Andreotti, Italy)

Supported by an increasingly attentive public opinion, negotiations have now reached the point of no return, and this is likely to be a decisive year in overcoming the greatest obstacles. Hence the need to deal resolutely and in an open spirit with those aspects of the convention that still require further political and juridical development. I am referring specifically to non-production, the institutional aspects, challenge inspections, and the destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities. Through serious debate, we have to resolve our existing differences and make a quantum leap forward without ignoring legitimate national concerns. For years now, the working group system has worked to everyone's satisfaction, and I am convinced that it will continue to do so in the light of the constructive changes recently adopted. However, we must also think in terms of restructuring some negotiating methods, so that we can more rapidly bridge the distance that still separates us from our goal.

A year ago, when I addressed this gathering, I suggested that a select working group should be given the task of identifying proposals to intensify the work of the Ad hoc Committee. I believe that this proposal is still worthy of careful consideration, and I wish to advance it once again today. In this context, it is first of all our view that the long intervals in the negotiating activity of the Committee should be reduced, so as to give the negotiations the necessary lasting impulse and an increased incisiveness. I consider very appropriate the creation of an ad hoc working group - as we had advocated - responsible for all verification aspects. To my mind, it is evident that, however complex this essential problem might be, it has to be dealt with comprehensively, not leaving the various aspects of it to be handled by different groups with little functional linkage between them.

While chemical weapons represent a priority issue, we are aware that the remit of the Conference on Disarmament comprises numerous other issues. On the subject of nuclear weapons, we cannot but welcome the progress recently made in the dialogue between the two leading Powers. The INF agreement is only a first step, but it also marks a historic new departure, and its implications for future agreements are already before our eyes. In this context, and also taking into consideration the approaching fourth review conference of the non-proliferation Treaty, the Italian Government hopes that negotiations will resume as soon as possible and will proceed rapidly towards their conclusion, with a view to achieving drastic reductions in strategic arsenals, in a framework of enhanced general stability.

The negotiations on nuclear tests which the United States and Soviet Union began in November 1987 also seem to be taking advantage of the favourable moment in the relations between these two countries. A process has been set in motion whose final outcome, though still far in the future, should be the total cessation of all nuclear tests, as an element of effective disarmament. In Geneva, much could be done to this effect. We regret that it has once again proven impossible to reach agreement on the procedures to be followed in order to open a substantive debate. A preliminary discussion is indispensable, designed to ascertain which of the various existing proposals or future initiatives could be conducive to substantive negotiations. In our view, such a debate would permit all countries to clarify their positions and identify the points of agreement and disagreement on the role that the Conference on Disarmament can play.

(Mr. Andreotti, Italy)

One of the final issues on which we are focusing our attention is the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Space is destined for peaceful activities, and its use or exploration must be for the benefit of all countries, whatever their level of economic and scientific development. Primary responsibility for seeking effective and verifiable agreements undoubtedly lies with the two leading Powers. I believe that both of them, like all of us, are fully aware that unrestrained competition in this field would eventually prove to be a costly and unproductive enterprise. The bilateral negotiations being conducted in Geneva, although complex and sensitive, suggest that a constructive approach will be pursued. We would wish to encourage the United States of America and the Soviet Union to reach an agreement which will safeguard strategic stability and foster co-operation, in the context of rigorous respect for existing agreements.

The current debate on this subject at the Conference on Disarmament is still in a preliminary phase: recently, however, it has been possible to make a detailed examination of issues of quite considerable importance: for example, the applicable legal régimes, terminology, and identifying activities conducted in space. This gathering can play a role of prime importance with regard to this problem, while making due allowances for the fact that many and diverse political, strategic and technological requirements converge, sometimes contradictorily. However, it is a sector of activity of enormous relevance to the peaceful future of mankind, and will require increased commitment on the part of us all.

We may wonder whether that disturbing state of international relations, hovering between impossible peace and improbable war, which has dominated the post-war period, is now drawing to an end. Some of the constraints, including psychological ones, which have been weighing heavily on our destinies and creating a world in which vast political and economic resouces have been squandered by rivalry and mutual suspicion, are beginning to fade. The United Nations is the workshop where a new form of coexistence is being fashioned.

Andrei Sakharov, who was a guest in Italy a few weeks ago, had this to tell us:

> "Progress has provided surprising answers to social problems. But we must tread carefully, because the enormous growth in technology is creating new threats to mankind: ecological disaster and nuclear conflict. There can be no solution to these problems unless there is ever broader international agreement."

Your commitment is vital to removing some of the barriers that still separate us from this better world. I will therefore conclude by wishing you every success in your work during the year which has just begun, and which already holds out great expectations.

Before leaving this gathering I would like to express my most heartfelt congratulations to Ambassador Yamada, who has assumed the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March, and wish him every success in the fulfilment of his task.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy for his important contribution to the work of the Conference. I would also like to thank Your Excellency for the very kind words you addressed to me.

I have no other speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage?

I will now proceed with our regular business. The secretariat has agreed today, at my request, to circulate an informal paper containing the timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the week 6-10 March. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if need be. If I see no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As I have no other business for today, I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting, but before doing so I would like to thank all the delegations, and in particular Ambassador García Robles, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, and Mr. Gomaa, Chairman of Working Group 2 of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, for their co-operation in accommodating the change of plenary schedule to this afternoon.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 7 March, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.492
7 March 1989

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 7 March 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Chusei Yamada (Japan)

GE.89-60376/0354B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 492nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all, I should like to inform the members of the Conference that at today's plenary meeting we have among us the participants in the Conference on "The United Nations Role in Disarmament and the Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts - From a Women's Perspective" who are following our discussions in the public gallery. The representatives of women from all over the world are gathering here in the Palais. Their conference is being held on the occasion of International Women's Day, which is to be celebrated tomorrow. On behalf of the Conference, I thank them for their interest in the work of our Conference and extend to them our cordial welcome. They have addressed a message to the Conference. As we have done previously, I should like to invite the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to read out the message for the information of the members and for the Conference's record.

Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): The message addressed to the Conference on Disarmament read as follows:

"We have gathered once again in Geneva to mark International Women's Day, and take the opportunity to wish the Conference members all success in their work during the 1989 session.

"As organizations, we work to promote women's involvement in disarmament and to ensure that women have a meaningful role in determining the future of humanity. Through the efforts of all peoples and Governments world-wide, we hope to see rapid advancement toward achieving disarmament.

"We believe that the current international climate provides historic opportunities for the resolution of international problems, and we also welcome the developments that have taken place during the past months. Amongst them are the conclusion of the INF agreement, the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the concluding document of the Vienna follow-up meeting in the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

"The participants in the Paris Conference stressed the urgency of concluding a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Although some obstacles still remain, we urge all the participating States to do their utmost to expedite the negotiations. We would like to see a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction before the end of this year.

"The Brundtland Commission Report on environment and development highlights the imperative need to reallocate global resources for the preservation of the environment and to fulfil the basic human needs of peoples throughout the world. While 30 children die of hunger every

(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations)

minute, $1.8 million is spent on global military expenditures. We believe that global priorities must be altered and resources must be applied for the betterment of humankind.

"The lasting significance of arms control and disarmament agreements depends upon our ability to bring an end to the arms race. New quantitative and qualitative enhancements to current weapons arsenals can render the achievements of existing agreements obsolete.

"It is for this reason that we continue to place the highest priority upon the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty as an important step towards significant and enduring disarmament measures. We urge the Conference on Disarmament to pursue a CTBT as a matter of the highest priority, and to establish an ad hoc committee to this end at the earliest possible date.

"We will continue to follow the work of the Conference on Disarmament with deep interest, and assure you of our support for all genuine disarmament efforts."

This ends the message.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Secretary-General of the Conference for reading out the message addressed to us by the non-governmental representatives taking part in the Conference on "The United Nations Role in Disarmament and the Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts - From a Women's Perspective". On behalf of the Conference, I thank the participants in that conference for transmitting to us their valuable views on the important matters of disarmament, and extend to them our very best wishes for the success of their conference.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference starts today its consideration of agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, in accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Canada, Peru and Australia. I now call upon the representative of Canada, Ambassador Marchand.

Mr. MARCHAND (Canada) (translated from French): It is an honour for me and for my country to take the floor this morning in the presence of the women whom you greeted at the beginning of the meeting. If you will allow me, I should like to associate myself with your words in wishing these women all the success they deserve during their conference here, and I wish also to pay tribute to this presence, renewed from one year to the next, the dynamism of the action of these women and also their serious-mindedness. Allow me also to adopt the approach of brevity urged on us by our former colleague Ambassador Butler of Australia in welcoming all our newly arrived colleagues in this Conference.

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

In my initial plenary statement of the current session, I would like to begin by stressing that Canada shares the generally hopeful assessment, already expressed by most preceding speakers, that our session is being held at a particularly propitious time, when new, encouraging prospects appear to be opening up in international relations, including in the disarmament field. I would begin by recalling the generally positive atmosphere that attached to SSOD-III, even though it ended without agreement on a substantive document. This positive atmosphere was even more perceptible during the forty-third United Nations General Assembly, in the First Committee, which Canada had the honour to chair. When the representative of the USSR addressed the final meeting of the First Committee on 30 November on behalf of the Group of Socialist States, I suspect he spoke for us all when he noted that, as never in the past, the Committee's work had been promoted by a positive international political climate. The number of resolutions and decisions adopted increased over the forty-second General Assembly, and so also did the number of consensus resolutions. The other major development was, of course, the January Paris Conference on the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Final Declaration of which was officially presented to us on 7 February by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Roland Dumas. Most importantly, there was the successful conclusion last month of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of the CSCE. This included the major decision to open two new negotiations relating to conventional armed forces in Europe. Little wonder that we should therefore be beginning our work for this session with heightened expectations of further progress.

That being noted, however, we should not allow too great a sense of euphoria to blind us to the very difficult outstanding issues that still confront us in relation to each of the eight substantive items on our agenda. When I first spoke in plenary, last year, on 10 March, I emphasized the fundamental importance attached by Canada to an element that must characterize both the bilateral process and our multilateral work, namely effective verification achieved through efficient, agreed implementation mechanisms. I further suggested that, to maintain confidence in compliance, precise and often intrusive verification provisions are a necessary and central element of politically viable arms control and disarmament agreements. The Canadian Government is still of that view, a view which I hope all of us share. If this is so, then all of us must also agree that, particularly in the context of our ongoing work on a chemical weapons convention, we must give intensified effort to resolving outstanding issues to formulate verification measures which will be both practical and effective.

In a few moments' time I shall speak in greater detail about some of our specific concerns relating to chemical weapons, outer space and a nuclear test-ban treaty; but before doing so I would like to support our colleagues Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany and Ambassador de Rivero of Peru, who on 16 and 28 February last invited us to consider focusing our work somewhat more on those aspects of it where lie the best chances of making genuine progress. I realize, of course, that each of the items on our programme of work has its own intrinsic value. Moreover, there is none among those items that does not find particular support among at least some of the countries which participate in our work. Nevertheless,

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

because of their subject-matter, in some cases, or because of the views about them held by some countries in other cases, not all are equally amenable to productive negotiation at this stage. Perhaps we should therefore spend more of our collective time and efforts, both of which are clearly finite and are already stretched almost to breaking-point, on areas such as a chemical weapons convention, where we are slowly but surely progressing and where virtually all sovereign States have specifically requested us to redouble our efforts. For these same reasons, I also share Ambassador von Stülpnagel's reservations about any possible expansion in the number of items with which we are seized. No doubt there are other subjects of importance to which the Conference on Disarmament could give attention: but not, I would suggest, until we have been successful in disposing of at least some of those already on our plates.

(continued in English)

Now I would like to address in more detail three among our agenda items which are of particular concern to Canada: items 1, 4 and 5. I shall speak only briefly about item 1, a nuclear test ban. It is a subject where the views of all among us have already been clearly stated; moreover it is one where responsibility for real movement forward lies utlimately with the nuclear-weapon States. It is they who must be persuaded that a régime providing for a comprehensive ban on testing can be in their own national security interest. They also must have a key role in determining the possibilities for devising verification measures in which we all can have real confidence. To this end, it is important that the bilateral dialogue and joint experimentation on nuclear test verification between the United States and the USSR continue and that it make progress toward further agreed test limitations. In the meantime, other States which strongly favour a comprehensive test ban, such as Canada, must do what they can to advance this process.

One area in which we have considered for many years that we could make a national contribution of genuine worth has been the area of verification. This commitment was re-emphasized by the Government of Canada in December of 1986 when, in response to one of the recommendations in an earlier joint Canadian House of Commons and Senate committee report supporting the need for adequate means of verification as a way of pursuing arms control, the Government confirmed that "through the work of the Verification Research Unit" of the Department of External Affairs it would be "advancing practical suggestions for verfication procedures". Many of you will already have seen some of the numerous papers and research documents in various fields that we have already produced and circulated to you.

Of particular relevance to our work in relation to agenda item 1 was our participation in the international seismic data exchange experiment that was conducted late in 1984. We followed that up with a workshop on the exchange of seismic wave-form data held in Ottawa in October 1986. Since then we have been devoting part of our resources, along with other Canadian governmental agencies, to upgrading and modernizing the Yellowknife Seismic Array, an internationally recognized facility which, when that modernization programme

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

is completed later this year, will constitute a world-class facility which we hope will serve as a prototype for other international stations to be developed to participate in an international seismic data network.

In one of my plenary statements last year, in which I also referred to the Yellowknife Seismic Array, I mentioned that in the autumn of this year Canada would be hosting a technical workshop in Yellowknife. Members of the Group of Scientific Experts will be invited to the official opening of the Array at that time. The occasion will include reporting on and discussion of Canadian research on nuclear test ban verification, as well as informal discussions of preparations for the forthcoming large-scale data exchange experiment which is being co-ordinated by the Canadian representative to the Group of Scientific Experts. In fact the Canadian representative will be extending the invitation to participants at its present meeting, which started yesterday and runs until 17 March.

Before leaving the subject of a comprehensive test ban I would be remiss not to say something, also, about the proposal to convene an amending conference of the partial test-ban Treaty, with the objective of somehow finding agreement to convert it into a comprehensive test ban. Clearly such a conference could be convened (I understand that at least 34 among the required 38 requests have already been received by the depositaries). But to what avail? It is evident that amendment of the partial test-ban Treaty as proposed will not obtain the assent of all three of the nuclear States who are original parties to the Treaty, as required for any amendment to come to effect. Moreover, not all among the present nuclear Powers are parties to the Treaty. For this and other reasons, including difficult issues such as comprehensive test ban verification which remain to be resolved, we in Canada therefore see little benefit in such an exercise. Further, we remain convinced that direct negotiations constitute the only practical means of achieving a comprehensive, genuinely verifiable test ban. We at the Conference on Disarmament might make our best contribution by reaching agreement on a mandate for establishing an ad hoc committee. There are practical things we could be doing, and Canada would welcome our beginning to work in this area on the basis of the suggested mandate in CD/863 of 23 August 1988, as proposed by our former colleague, Czechoslovak Ambassador Vejvoda.

Now let me turn to our agenda item 5, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It seems to us that in our consideration of item 5 we are perhaps too often overly selective in our focus. Given the importance of the use of space for the present and future development of mankind, it is clearly of particular importance for us to give serious thought to one very broad and somewhat imprecise issue - namely, the relationship between international security, on the one hand, and the uses of space, on the other. Both of the two elements that comprise this relationship deserve greater conceptual thought, as does the relationship itself.

International security in this context relates not only to the absence of weapons as such in outer space. The responsibility of the two major space Powers, both to themselves and to the rest of us, is to maintain a stable

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

controlled relationship between themselves. We, in the multilateral area, must not forget this point. That is why this delegation has emphasized both that we must take great care to ensure that the results of our work will enhance stability, rather than detract from it, and that our negotiations complement the bilateral negotiations that are taking place between the two major space powers.

We must also consider the actual use being made of outer space. Until recently, space activities have been effectively dominated by the two major space Powers. They have allocated huge resources and developed revolutionary technologies with the goal of managing their strategic relationship to which I have just referred. That situation is, however, now changing every day. One of the specific challenges for the multilateral disarmament world will be not only to put technological developments in space to good use but, even more important, to come to a common understanding as to what such "good use" is.

The point of the foregoing is to underline our contention that the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space should give much more attention to the basic framework involved in the use of space: to strengthen the current régime, to agree on the definition of key terms, to clarify the issue of stability and, in general, thereby to set up a solid foundation to guide our work in the coming years. I would further contend that this is one area where multilateral efforts would be particularly appropriate.

This exhortation, that we seek better to set out the essential parameters of our work in this field, is not to say that the Ad hoc Committee (once it is established) should not also focus on particular questions. In that regard, we in Canada continue to believe, with respect to the registration Convention, that it would be a helpful confidence-building measure were the parties to provide more timely and specific information concerning the functions of the satellites they launch, including whether specific satellites are intended to fulfil civilian, military or combined functions.

As a member of the Conference on Disarmament with a special interest in progress in this field, and as, moreover, this year's co-ordinator for the Western Group, we in the Canadian delegation had hoped that the ad hoc committee on item 5 could have been established this time with a minimum of procedural wrangling. This has not proved to be so, but my delegation regards the attention being given to this item as a hopeful indication of our shared desire to look seriously at what is involved in the prevention of an arms race in outer space and, through our collective work, make some gains in pursuit of that objective.

Before I leave this item, I would like to inform the Conference that our Verification Research Unit has already completed the preparation of a single-volume outer space compendium covering all the statements made during the course of our 1988 sessions and including all the working papers that were issued. This document, which we hope will prove a useful working tool and point of reference for our future use, was distributed by the secretariat on 28 February under cover of CD/891 dated 22 February.

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

Finally, let me turn to the fourth subject on our agenda, chemical weapons. Here too we have papers to distribute, which we hope will also prove useful to you. One is the first issue in a new series which we will be preparing of arms control verification occasional papers. It is entitled "International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards: Observations on lessons for verifying a chemical weapons convention". Others among these occasional papers will be issued periodically. They are primarily intended for a specialist audience, and they represent the results of selected independent research undertaken by our Verification Research Programme. For this reason the views expressed in them are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Canadian Government. The second set of papers we have to distribute is a three-volume compendium on chemical weapons covering our 1988 session. The volumes cover plenary statements (PVs), plenary working papers (WPs) and Ad hoc Committee papers (CD/CW/WPs). I would draw to your attention that several Ad hoc Committee papers which were tabled after the close of the 1988 formal session in September 1988 are not included in the third volume. We hope to receive these volumes from Canada any day now and will distribute them to you soon afterwards.

This leads me to the more substantive remarks on our work on chemical weapons with which I would like to conclude this statement. Essentially they comprise a reiteration of some of our long-standing concerns about difficult aspects of our work that nevertheless must be resolved if ever we are to succeed. As I have already stated, probably the single most important task before us, without which we can never hope to find broad support for any convention, is to establish an agreed and effective verification framework. In the words of the Paris Conference Final Declaration, the convention must be "global and comprehensive and effectively verifiable". In our view, to be effective, the verification régime must be practical. It must use resources efficiently and at a tolerable cost. In this context you may recall that on 31 March last year Canada circulated CD/823, a working paper which examined factors involved in determining verification inspectorate personnel and resource requirements. We are at present working on a follow-up paper, examining the cost implications of establishing inspectorate, which we hope to be able to provide to you later this year. Again, our purpose is to advance the process of discussing this crucial aspect of our work on verification in the chemical weapons convention context.

If we are to make further progress, it will be important for us to come to grips with those important problems which still lie ahead that have a political as well as technical dimension. One is challenge inspections: here, notwithstanding what appears to be a general acceptance, at least in principle, of this concept, a number of States still seem to have difficulties in accepting the degree of intrusion which will be needed to make challenge inspection an effective verification measure. Another thorny issue is that of the composition of and the powers to be assigned to the proposed Executive Council. Here we will have to reach agreement among a number of hard choices about the degree of authority this organ will require in order to supervise implementation of the convention and how to hold it accountable for its action. How to select its members has also still to be settled. There remain still other problems. Articles X and XI are particularly sensitive: but

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

solutions that fully respect the concerns of the various participants in the negotiations on them ought to be available: it will be a matter of making the necessary choices, keeping in mind that our overall objective is an effective convention. On undiminished security during the transition period, the problem is different: we do not yet have sufficiently clear ideas of what the concerns of some among us about this matter really are. But, if we can resolve related outstanding issues respecting the principles and order of destruction, surely some of those concerns will be alleviated. Another, different but still difficult, issue is that of confidentiality. It is of especial interest for countries with highly developed chemical industries operating in a highly competitive international environment, and whose legitimate commercial concerns must be taken into account.

There are other aspects of our work on a chemical weapons convention which can best be dealt with by experts. Perhaps the most important issues in this sense relate to definitions and criteria under article II and to the content and number of the schedules to be required under article VI. Among those inputs required from legal experts there are two of particular concern to Canada. One is the need for us to consider the meaning of the phrase "jurisdiction and control", a phrase that gives rise to issues of extra-territoriality. Canada would prefer that this phrase be deleted from the text and that more specific wording could be found to describe a signatory's obligations. Another relates to article XII, where for now I will merely recall the Canadian suggestion, made last August, that this separate article may not in fact be required.

Another important point I wish to register relates to suggestions which have been made, here and at the Paris Conference, to the effect that conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons should be conditional on progress in nuclear arms control. The Canadian Government emphatically disagrees. A complete ban on chemical weapons is desirable in itself. It is, in the Canadian view, in the interest of countries of all regions. It should not be conditional on progress in other areas.

My list of outstanding "difficult" issues is by no means exhaustive. Nor is it intended in any way to downplay the importance of others which I have not cited. My purpose has been, rather, to remind us that more than mere good will and the intention to work harder will be required from us if we are to make the sort of progress at this session which both the General Assembly and the Paris Conference have called for.

In concluding, I am pleased to be able to tell this Conference that Canada will be joining those member States that have already carried out or plan to carry out trial inspections. We will provide the results as soon as they become available.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Marchand of Canada for his statement. The next speaker is the representative of Peru, Ambassador de Rivero.

Mr. de RIVERO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): May I say, Mr. President, how pleased my delegation feels to see you presiding over the Conference on Disarmament this month? You are a distinguished representative of a great nation that has historical links with my country. I have no doubt you will make a valuable contribution to guiding our work, and I should also like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation to the distinguished Ambassador of Italy, Mr. Aldo Pugliese, for the excellent work he did in the same post last month.

As representatives of various women's non-governmental organizations in favour of the role of women for peace in this present-day world are present in this room, I should also like to greet them and congratulate them on their work. I should also like to take advantage of the fact that I have the floor and that tomorrow is International Women's Day, which should not be interpreted to mean that my wife will not let me speak tomorrow, but that tomorrow there is no plenary, to congratulate all the ladies members of our delegations, the ladies members of the secretariat, of the services, the ladies present here.

I should like this time to refer to agenda item 1, relating to the total cessation of nuclear tests. As I said on another occasion, the paralysis of the Conference in this respect is, regrettably, striking proof of its limitations in providing an appropriate response to the imperative that stems from the world-wide clamour to ban all nuclear tests once and for all. For over 25 years this sole multilateral negotiating forum has shown a certain inability to arrive at a consensus formula which will allow discussion with a view to the holding of multilateral negotiations on a treaty prohibiting this. I am not going to recapitulate the most important episodes in this unconsummated tale. However, it is proper to recall that the bilateral negotiations that have been conducted since 1977 by the States depositaries of the partial test-ban Treaty have certainly opened up an unprecedented possibility to chart the correct course, which has regrettably not been realized as a result of disagreements concerning the priority to be given to this issue within the process of nuclear disarmament.

It was this realization of the lack of political will and the paralysis of the Conference on Disarmament that in 1985 prompted Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia to place before the United Nations General Assembly a draft resolution which recommended that the contracting parties to the 1963 Treaty should carry out urgent consultations as to the advisability of convening a conference to amend this multilateral instrument by extending the test ban to underground areas, thus making it absolute and total. Three years later and in view of the continued stagnation in the Conference on Disarmament, despite the favourable reaction of the majority of its members to the draft mandate submitted by the Group of 21 (CD/829), these same five States, in the welcome company of Venezuela, were compelled on 5 August last year to submit to the States depositaries of the 1963 Treaty a request for the convening of such a conference, together with a specific proposal which appears in document CD/852.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

As the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico pointed out in his statement on 8 February last, the amendment proposal originally formulated by these six States has been widely welcomed, to the point where it now has around 33 co-sponsors, which shows how much a measure of this type is desired. In other words, we are very close to the threshold of 39 contracting parties required to set in motion the procedure described in article II of that international instrument, which permits the initiation of negotiations proper.

A new avenue has been opened since 1985 and is being consolidated in 1988. It would be impossible to understand or explain if the Conference on Disarmament had already shouldered its responsibilities with regard to item 1 of its agenda, the first item. Unfortunately it has not done so, and now we see this sole multilateral negotiating forum facing the imminent risk of letting the urgent question of the total cessation of nuclear tests elude its grasp. But what is important is not the means but the end.

Last year we celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This is far and away the international instrument that has the greatest number of parties. There are about 140 States parties, Peru being one of the 58 countries that signed it at the very moment it was opened for signature, on 1 July, and the 28th to become a contracting party, even before two of the three depositary States. With these credentials in hand, in addition to the status as a contracting party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco from 4 March 1969, I think it is proper for me to make some comments on this today. Firstly, my delegation reaffirms my country's support for that international instrument, and stresses its importance for the maintenance of international peace and security. Like any human endeavour the NPT is not a perfect multilateral instrument. However, it is an important landmark in collective multilateral efforts to curb horizontal nuclear proliferation and reverse vertical proliferation. From the standpoint of history as it might have been, the treaty might perhaps have been better, especially as regards the provisions of article VI, concerning the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. But this was not the case, and what we need to do now is to strengthen it, seeking full compliance with all the obligations entered into by the parties.

Secondly, while the NPT has to date not achieved the universality initially sought, it is none the less true that it has provided a bulwark against the temptation of covert horizontal proliferation, which has undeniable repercussions in the regional context. Of course, an additional effort is still required. It is also clear that a very important role is being played here by the trade policies of the supplying countries - this is very important - whose indulgence at a certain point rendered a disservice to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation.

One last comment relates to the limited results that have been obtained both in nuclear co-operation between States parties and in the realization of a fundamental aspiration shared by all - the cessation of nuclear testing once and for all. In respect of article IV, there is a need to give a new impetus to technical and scientific assistance to developing countries which are

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

contracting parties to the NPT so that they can reduce their budgets for training of technical personnel, and also make better use of the many benefits of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

As for the question of a nuclear test ban, it might be a happy coincidence for the convening of the conference to amend the 1963 Moscow Treaty to precede the holding of the fourth NPT review conference, which is scheduled for mid-1990. If so, if that happens, my delegation deems it perfectly legitimate to hope that the two ad hoc forums might crystallize converging processes aimed at providing a definitive reply to the universal aspiration for the prohibition of all nuclear testing. Another development of great significance might be the happy conclusion next year of an agreement between the two big Powers providing for substantial reductions in their strategic arsenals in accordance with a timetable and in association with restrictions on the modernization of the remaining nuclear weapons. We are not unaware of the technical and political implications that both objectives involve. However, the possibility of success is inherent in the logic that made feasible the signature and entry into force of the Washington Treaty for the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador de Rivero of Peru for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me and to my country. The next speaker is the representative of Australia. I give the floor to Ambassador Reese.

Mr. REESE (Australia): As this is the first time I have taken the floor at this Conference, I would like to thank colleagues who have welcomed me in their statements and assure them that Australia will continue to play the active role in this Conference which Australia played under my predecessor.

I am also pleased, Mr. President, that I make my first statement while you are in the chair, and in the presence of participants in the Conference entitled "The United Nations Role in Disarmament and the Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts - From a Women's Perspective", which is being held on the occasion of International Women's Day to be celebrated tomorrow.

While it is my intention to address particula items on our agenda as the session progresses, I have asked for the floor tod to bring to the attention of the Conference on Disarmament an important arms control initiative of the Australian Government.

The Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, announced today, 7 March, that Australia will host a major international chemical weapons conference later this year. The conference will bring together Governments and representatives of the international chemical industry to discuss the growing problem of the international trade in feedstocks, plant and equipment which are to be used for chemical weapons purposes. The initiative follows discussions between Australian and United States officials, and between Senator Evans and the United States Secretary of State, Mr. James Baker, about how best to build on

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

the momentum generated by the Paris Conference on chemical weapons in January. The date of the conference, and details relating to participation in it, are still to be finalized.

In his announcement Senator Evans said that for some time Australia had been actively developing measures to address the problem of the spread of chemical weapons. Since 1985, Australia had brought together representatives of industrial nations which export certain relevant chemicals, to ensure that their industries were not associated, even inadvertently, with the production of chemical weapons. This group, which met regularly in Paris, has now become known as the Australia Group.

Australia has had a productive dialogue with other Governments and the chemical industry for some time, including as leader of the Australia Group, on how best to advance the objective of preventing the spread of chemical weapons while not impeding the legitimate activities of the civil chemical industry. One clear lesson from these discussions has been the need to work closely with the chemical industry. Senator Evans said that the proposed conference - designed to bring together Governments and chemical industry representatives in a joint problem-solving dialogue - would benefit from the background of close relations which have developed between the Australian chemical industry and the Australian Government. Australia sees the purposes of the Conference as being supportive of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for a comprehensive and universal ban on chemical weapons. The chemical weapons convention remains Australia's priority objective.

I will ask the secretariat that the full text of Senator Evans' statement be circulated as a document of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Reese of Australia for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage? I recognize the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador van Schaik.

Mr. van SCHAIK (Netherlands): The reason that I wish to say a few words is that today we are honoured with the presence of special guests. Many of them have come a long way. You yourself have mentioned in particular the presence of representatives to the Conference on "The United Nations Role in Disarmament and the Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts - From a Women's Perspective."

Let me say how much my delegation appreciates the fact that non-governmental delegations, as well as private citizens - women and men - pay attention to our work. The interest they express today will one day transform itself into opinions and advice. Without the people's advice, we run the risk of becoming mandarins, whose wisdom may have too little to do with the outside world. And, speaking for a moment only of our female

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

visitors, I recall the words of one of the first suffragettes, Emmeline Pankhurst, who in 1908, speaking from a dock in London, said: "We are here not because we are law-breakers; we are here in our efforts to become lawmakers". Mr. President, let it be so.

We here in this august hall are sitting far away from those who observe us from above. That is quite a difference with the setting a few hundred yards from here, where, in the human rights Commission, it is difficult for delegates not to stumble over the body of a representative of a non-governmental organization or a journalist of some sort. Styles differ, and each has its merits. But wherever they may be, on the upper gallery, in the lobby or on the floor, my delegation wishes to assure those who follow our debate that, outside of this room, my delegation is always ready for substantive discussion of themes that bring us here together.

Forgive me for this brief excursion into an area that is not normally the subject of our discussions. Our relations with the outside world are perhaps an under-exposed subject that requires a more serious debate, but today I wanted to limit myself to these words of welcome to the audience above us. I hope soon to make a somewhat more substantive contribution to our debate. Since this is the first time I have taken the floor this month, I wish to say how much my delegation appreciates seeing you in the Chair. Japan is a country whose deep interest in, and involvement with, matters of disarmament we admire. Your own dedication and personal interest, supported by a lucid mind, give us great confidence in your leadership. I also wish to thank the President for the month of February, Aldo Pugliese, for the excellent way in which he has tacked over the wild waves of the always difficult first month of a year's session.

To conclude, I also wish to welcome colleaques who have arrived since I spoke last. I wish them success in their endeavours, here and elsewhere, and I hope they will enjoy their participation in this Conference as much as I have done and still do.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador van Schaik of the Netherlands for his statement, and for the very kind words he addressed to me and to my country. Does any other member wish to take the floor?

If no other member wishes to take the floor, I should like to inform you that my consultations on the establishment of an ad hoc committee under agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", are proceeding. I will again take up this matter with the co-ordinators at our regular meeting tomorrow, in order to establish whether we have consensus on this matter. If this is so, then I intend to put before the Conference, for decision, a draft mandate for the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee and, at the same time, we shall take up requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Ad hoc Committee.

Distinguished delegates, you are aware that our meetings schedule is quite congested. In order to accommodate the increased requirements for meetings, in particular those of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, we

(The President)

must make the best use of the conference services made available to us. Short plenaries should be followed by meetings of the subsidiary bodies. In order to programme those meetings in an organized manner, we need to know the length of the plenary meetings in advance. I would therefore like to request you to register your names not later than midday Wednesday when you plan to address the plenary in the following week - that is to say, please register by noon tomorrow if you wish to speak in the plenary either on Tuesday or Thursday next week. This is by no means intended to set a deadline; each delegation has the right to request the floor at the last minute - I simply ask for your understanding and co-operation so that we can better organize our meetings.

I have no other business for today, and I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 9 March 1989, at 10.a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.493
9 March 1989

PT.

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 9 March 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Chusei Yamada (Japan)

GE.89-60402/0368B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 493rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will continue today its consideration of agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, in accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

In connection with the agenda item under consideration today, I am happy to inform you that agreement has been reached at informal consultations on the mandate and the Chairman for the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Accordingly, I shall put before the Conference for adoption today a draft decision on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee, the appointment of the Chairman and also draft decisions on requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference.

At the meeting of co-ordinators yesterday we agreed, for practical reasons, to dispense with the procedure of first holding an informal meeting to discuss these questions. Therefore, we shall take up these matters at this plenary meeting once the list of speakers has been exhausted.

I have on my list of speakers today the representative of Mongolia. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia): Mr. President, I would like to say how pleased I am to see you in the Chair. I am confident that your calm candour and oriental wisdom, along with your great diplomatic skills, will enable you to steer successfully the work of the Conference on Disarmament for this month. I would like to thank Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, who as your predecessor in this high post has given a good start to our 1989 session. I also take this opportunity to extend my delegation's warm welcome to the new representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Burma, India, Belgium, the German Democratic Republic, Sweden, Australia, Kenya, Pakistan, Algeria and Czechoslovakia. I assure them the co-operation of the Mongolian delegation.

The 1989 session of the Conference on Disarmament is being held in an atmosphere of growing expectations that tangible and practical results will be achieved in its work. These hopes are generated by the significant positive changes that have occurred in the domain of international relations, as well as the important understandings that have been reached in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. The process set in motion for cutting nuclear arsenals is now being supplemented by negotiations between 23 States on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe.

The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons met the world's expectations and served as an important landmark in the struggle to rid our planet of chemical weapons. This being so, as we see it, the quest for disarmament is gaining qualitatively new parameters in all its basic directions. There is growing awareness and determination to renounce the

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

principle of over-arming and to turn to the principle of defensive sufficiency. Not only are old stereotypes being overcome and certain values reassessed, but a new realistic approach to greater confidence and security is taking shape.

Mongolia welcomes the continued successful implementation of the INF Treaty, and expects that the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons will resume soon so as to bring about the declared objective of a 50 per cent reduction in their strategic offensive arms, while preserving the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972.

In our opinion, the relaxation of military confrontation in Europe would have a most favourable impact on strengthening stability and security not only on this continent but throughout the world. The decision of the Soviet Union unilaterally to reduce its armed forces and armaments in Europe and Asia, as declared by General Secretary Gorbachev at the United Nations General Assembly session last December, as well as the corresponding decisions taken by the other Warsaw Treaty member States, have made a valuable practical contribution to the whole process of disarmament, and enhanced confidence among nations, and they clearly demonstrate the determination of these States to see a breakthrough in the field of conventional disarmament as well.

As was announced earlier by the leaders of my country and the USSR, most of the Soviet troops temporarily stationed on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic will return home during 1989-1990. I am happy to inform the Conference on Disarmament that my Government recently decided to reduce the numerical strength of our country's armed forces by 13,000 in 1989-1990, and to convert 1,000 transport vehicles and 90 tracked and armoured vehicles for use in the civilian economy. I have asked the secretariat to distribute the text of this decision as an official document of the CD, and the secretariat is now circulating it. It should be emphasized that my Government's decision is fully in line with the objective of furthering the development of the national economy and increasing financial and human resources to enhance the well-being of our people.

All these decisions have been prompted by our genuine desire to promote by deeds confidence and co-operation in relations among States, and also the positive developments taking place in the world as a whole, and in Asia in particular.

Like many others, we think that conditions for disarmament are now as favourable as they are ever likely to be. Therefore, it would be an unforgivable mistake if the Conference were not to take advantage of the day, and did not offer its worthy contribution to furthering the positive changes taking place the world over. Here, in our opinion, the current year, 1989, should be a crucial turning-point as we move towards completion of work on the chemical weapons convention.

As was rightly pointed out by His Excellency Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, in his statement on 2 March 1989, given good will on the part of everyone concerned, the finalization of the convention ought to be possible by the end of this year.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

It is extremely important that the negotiations on chemical weapons should not lose momentum. During the negotiations, all efforts should be directed towards finding solutions to pending problems, rather than revising compromises achieved through a great amount of painstaking work.

The current state of affairs of the negotiations allows us to conclude that today there is no problem that cannot be resolved or that could long hamper the ongoing negotiations. Yes, there are problems, for the moment, which are mainly of a technical nature. Given the desire on everyone's part to search for common understanding, they could be agreed upon without much difficulty.

Speaking on the question of chemical weapons, I will limit my remarks mainly to its verification aspects. As for the other problems related to the chemical weapons negotiations, I will address them in a future statement. The Ad hoc Committee is now focusing attention, inter alia, on the question of verification, which occupies a prominent place among the outstanding problems. Hence, we welcome the creation of a working group to deal with the subject. The "rolling text" of our future convention contains the main mechanisms of verification which have been elaborated to varying degrees. Some of them have almost been completed, whereas others are being worked out.

Like many others, my delegation considers that whenever one raises the question of verification of the convention, one has to proceed from the premise that the security interests of States should prevail over commercial and other interests. Naturally, we could think about the specific interests of given companies and take them into consideration wherever possible. In the course of negotiations, a number of delegations have come up with valuable ideas and proposals on the question of verification, including the idea of making good use of relevant verification provisions contained in the INF Treaty and the document of the Stockholm Conference, as well as the day-to-day practice of the International Atomic Energy Agency wherever feasible. Though we understand that they cover different subjects, nothing will prevent us from studying the good experience gained there. This could be done, in our opinion, in Working Group 1 on verification.

There are other priority questions on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, while of central importance, should not be allowed to overshadow other agenda items. What I have in mind, first and foremost, is item 1, "Nuclear test ban", which has always been and remains a key topic because of what it would mean for stopping the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament. Further inaction on the part of the Conference on this vital issue will find no justification whatsoever. A large number of proposals aimed at creating a subsidiary body which would seriously grapple with the problem of a nuclear test ban are currently on the table in the Conference. While not excluding other possibilities, we still see in document CD/863 a way out of the deadlock on the issue of a mandate. The Conference has definitely not exhausted all possible ways of establishing a working body. For example, in the search for a common approach, the "mandate question" might be discussed at the informal

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

open-ended consultations under your guidance, Mr. President, in order to facilitate the creation of an ad hoc committee. My delegation pledges its full support and co-operation in your endeavour to overcome this stalemate.

At the same time, it is essential to pursue the work on the elaboration of a seismic verification system for the CTB. This system should be based on the international exchange of wave-form (level II) data. In our opinion, besides seismic verification of the non-conduct of nuclear explosions, on-site inspection and radiation safety monitoring, other measures of verification could possibly be applied in this field. We share the assessment you made in your statement of 28 February 1989, Mr. President, that "we may be coming to a point where we should start thinking seriously about the multiple facets of verification from a broader and more purpose-oriented perspective, and give proper guidance to the work of the GSE".

In this respect, we feel that there are good prospects for creating a group of scientific experts to be assigned the urgent task of preparing practical proposals on the system of verification of the non-conduct of nuclear explosions. Providing it did not duplicate the work of the Group of Seismic Experts, this mechanism could also be entrusted with the task of conducting an exchange of opinions on the place and role of seismic components in an overall verification system.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is one of the priorities of disarmament negotiations. As was eloquently pointed out by His Excellency Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, "it is a sector of activity of enormous relevance to the peaceful future of mankind, and will require increased commitment on the part of us all". We have just heard the good news of the agreement on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on outer space.

During 1985-1988, in the Ad hoc Committee, representatives of the member States of the CD drew attention to a number of issues such as: the status of outer space as the common heritage of mankind; the need to prevent an arms race in outer space; the non-deployment of weapons in outer space; the interrelationship between the prevention of an arms race in outer space and arms limitation and disarmament measures in other fields; the relationship between bilateral and multilateral efforts aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space; the definition of space weapons; the improvement of the working procedures of the Ad hoc Committee; the necessity of strengthening the existing legal régime; and the problems related to verification and compliance.

Many delegations favoured a mandate for the Ad hoc Committee that would provide for negotiations, considering that the stage of identifying and examining the problems pertaining to the prevention of an arms race in outer space is over, and they stressed that it was indispensable to embark upon more substantial work. Almost all the members of the Conference on Disarmament have expressed their attitude vis-à-vis the idea of starting multilateral negotiations. Proposals of a comprehensive nature, and those partially covering certain aspects of the problem, have been tabled before the Ad hoc Committee.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

If we are not all prepared to enter negotiations on the substance of these proposals, we could first take up the partial or "supplementary" measures, including measures to strengthen confidence and openness in this field. Here the idea put forward by the Federal Republic of Germany for the devising of "rules of the road" in space merits our interest. The Argentine proposal that every member State of the Conference on Disarmament should declare that weapons have not been deployed in outer space on a permanent basis is very important, in our opinion.

Thus we can see that during its work in 1985-1988 the Ad hoc Committee has accumulated a great number of useful ideas and proposals. Most of them contain constructive elements which are acceptable to the majority and constitute a good basis for concrete and purposeful negotiations. What is more, ideas and suggestions for negotiations have been put forward by all countries, including those which are at present not prepared for the commencement of concrete negotiations.

These are a few remarks that my delegation has to offer at this stage of our work.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Bayart for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me. I have no other speakers on my list for today. Before we proceed to the decision on agenda item 5, may I ask whether any other delegation wishes to take the floor? I recognize the representative of Egypt.

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt): I would like to make the following statement on behalf of the Group of 21 with respect to the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, but before doing so - and since this is the first time that I have taken the floor this month - I would like, on behalf of my delegation, to extend to you, Sir, our best wishes and to express our gratitude to Ambassador Pugliese.

The Group continues to underline the importance of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes and the urgency of preventing an arms race from occurring in outer space.

The General Assembly on 7 December 1988 adopted resolution 43/70 on the prevention of an arms race in outer space with an overwhelming majority and only one dissenting vote. The resolution requested the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space and to intensify its consideration of that question, in all its aspects, taking into account all relevant proposals and initiatives. The resolution further requested the Conference on Disarmament to "re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1989 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects".

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

The Group of 21 remains fully committed to the provisions of this resolution. It considers its adoption as an endorsement of a desire to entrust the Ad hoc Committee with the task of improving the mandate in a manner commensurate with the responsibilities of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations.

Faced once again with a rigid position taken by the Western Group, and in particular by one delegation belonging to that group, the Group of 21 regrets that it was not found possible to improve the mandate in accordance with the above-mentioned General Assembly resolution, nor to reiterate the proceedings involving a statement by the President of the Conference as was done in previous years.

In view of the pressing need to address, without delay, the important question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which necessitates the prompt re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee, the Group of 21 decided, once again, to demonstrate further good will and flexibility in agreeing to work on the basis of the mandate of the previous years. Nevertheless, the Group of 21 recalls that the mandate covers the consideration of proposals for measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group of 21 believes that the Ad hoc Committee should therefore start work immediately in order to achieve progress and attain positive results.

This is the statement that my delegation was charged with delivering on behalf of the Group of 21.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Elaraby for his statement on behalf of the Group of 21, and for the very kind words he addressed to me. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor before we proceed to take a decision on the mandate?

I now intend to put before the Conference the draft mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space contained in working paper CD/WP.358. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I should now like to propose the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. I understand that there is consensus in the Conference on appointing Ambassador Luvsandorjiin Bayart of Mongolia as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. May I take it that there is agreement in the Conference?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Ambassador Bayart, on behalf of the Conference, I would like to extend to you our most sincere congratulations upon your appointment as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and our very best wishes for success. You were the Chairman of the same Committee in 1986, and I am convinced that under your able leadership the Committee will have fruitful consideration of agenda item 5.

(The President)

I shall now take up requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Ad hoc Committee. You will recall that the relevant draft decisions concerning agenda item 5 were circulated at the plenary meeting held on 16 February, and another circulation is being made today. At that plenary meeting, my predecessor noted that for technical reasons relating to the consultations being held then, the secretariat had prepared the working papers relating to invitations to non-members with reference to the subsidiary bodies on agenda items 4 and 5. Of course, the references to agenda item 4 should now be disregarded, as action has already been taken on them. We shall then only consider working paper CD/WP.359 and its addenda 1 to 19 with respect to agenda item 5. To facilitate the process of decision-making, I shall list those countries cited in that working paper as requesting participation under agenda item 5, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space": Norway, Spain, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal, Denmark, Turkey, Senegal, Greece and Zimbabwe. We shall also take a decision on the request received from Chile, the relevant draft decision also having been circulated today as working paper CD/WP.362. As no objection has been raised to inviting the non-members concerned to participate in our work under agenda item 5, I suggest that we take up all the requests together. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decisions.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I understand that the representative of Hungary requests the floor.

Mr. VARGA (Hungary): First of all, Mr. President, I would like to congratulate you on your accession to the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March. I am confident that the Conference on Disarmament will make further progress on its priority agenda items as it has done under your able guidance up till now.

I have asked for the floor to make a short comment - on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries - on the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. I would like to thank you - on behalf of our Group - for your untiring and eventually successful efforts to abolish the difficulties standing in the way of the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. The Group on behalf of which I am speaking has taken note of the flexible position of the Group of 21 - as we heard a couple of minutes ago - contributing thereby a great deal to solving the problem of the setting up of the Ad hoc Committee. I express our congratulations to Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, and wish him success in his responsible task. We are sure that his experience will contribute to achieving further progress in this important field.

Resolution 43/70 of the General Assembly of the United Nations recommended that the Conference on Disarmament should activate the consideration of the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking into consideration the relevant suggestions and initiatives. It also recommended the setting up of an ad hoc committee at

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

its 1989 session with a view to starting negotiations on the conclusion of a convention or conventions on the issue. The Group of Socialist Countries is of the opinion that it is more timely than ever to make serious efforts for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, to speed up multilateral efforts in this respect - first of all those of the Conference on Disarmament.

We have just adopted a decision on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and on its mandate. The agreement on the mandate, reached in spite of the well-known difficulties, as well as the start of the substantive work of the Committee, is a matter of satisfaction for us, although we are somewhat unhappy with the delay. The Group of Socialist Countries cannot help, however, expressing its disappointment over the fact that in recent years the Ad hoc Committee has been prevented from entering into real negotiating work on key issues on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Nevertheless, we consider that the Ad hoc Committee will be in a position to accomplish purpose-oriented work through an appropriately structured discussion, conducted with a veiw to preparing the basis for future negotiations on the subject. Item 3 of its programme of work provides for that. We think that the main thrust of the work should be directed to substantive discussion and evaluation of the existing proposals and initiatives, concentrating on the convergence of views concerning particular issues. Substantive consideration could, in our view, be given to the working out of agreements aimed at the effective prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The ideas and initiatives put forward during recent years provide a reliable basis for fruitful work in the Ad hoc Committee. We do hope that those involved in the discussion will make good use of them.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Varga for his statement on behalf of the Socialist Group, and for the very kind words he addressed to me. I recognize the representative of Canada.

Mr. MARCHAND (Canada): Speaking on behalf of my Group, I wish to express primarily pleasure but also disappointment at what I have heard this morning at the Group of 21's acceptance of consensus as was communicated to us in this Conference. First, pleasure, because obviously our Group, like all the others, welcomes the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee. Pleasure also because we note with satisfaction the comprehensive nature of the mandate that we have adopted today to define the work of the Committee, and the fact that that mandate allows all delegations to address the subjects they consider important and urgent. Pleasure finally, because I take pride in indicating the desire of the Western Group to contribute fully to the work of the Committee.

Disappointment also I have to register. We at the CD are dealing with the fundamental national security concerns of all countries represented here. We are not engaged in an academic exercise, but we are engaged with real work, of real importance. To single out a particular delegation and its position on important issues is not conducive to the proper advancement of our work.

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

Having said this, Mr. President, I wish to thank you, and indeed your predecessor Ambassador Pugliese, for the active interest you have taken in the matter which this morning comes to its dénouement.

Finally, I wish to congratulate Ambassador Bayart, who has just received the confidence of this Conference, and I wish to assure him of my Group's full co-operation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Marchand for his statement on behalf of the Western Group. I now give the floor to Ambassador Fan of China.

Mr. FAN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, I am very pleased to see the presidency of the CD for the month of March in your hands. China and Japan are close neighbours, and at present are co-operating in many areas. China commits itself to the development of long-term stable neighbourly and friendly relations with Japan. You are a seasoned diplomat rich in experience, and you have a penetrating knowledge of disarmament matters. I am convinced that under your skilful guidance work at the CD will register new progress. During your term, the Chinese delegation is willing to enter into close co-operation with you. I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to express my appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Pugliese, for his outstanding work during the month of February.

In my statement in February I pointed out that the prevention of an arms race in outer space should be a new priority in disarmament. China has all along insisted that the exploration and exploitation of outer space should serve peaceful purposes, and is opposed to an arms race in outer space. China supported resolution 43/70 on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, adopted by the General Assembly, at its forty-third session, and we favour the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of the 1989 session with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

We are of the view that the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee should always adapt itself to changing circumstances. In the past three years, the statement made by the President of the CD at the time of the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee concerning its mandate has been useful. This year the effort made by the Group of 21 to improve upon the mandate and to reaffirm the statement of the President was justified. At the same time, the Chinese delegation has taken note of the fact that different parties still hold divergent views on this matter. We appreciate the good will and flexibility displayed by the Group of 21 to enable the Ad hoc Committee to be re-established and embark on its work as soon as possible.

In order to enable the Ad hoc Committee to enter into substantive work as soon as possible, the Chinese delegation will go along with the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on the basis of the present mandate. I would also like to congratulate Ambassador Bayart warmly on assuming the chairmanship of this Committee. I am convinced that his able guidance will lead the Ad hoc Committee to positive progress.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Fan for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me and to my country. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this moment? I recognize the representative of the United States of America.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): I have asked for the floor today to explain our delegation's position on the issue of a negotiated presidential statement in conjunction with the adoption of a mandate for an ad hoc committee on prevention of an arms race in outer space. Our delegation opposed such a statement. It has always been the position of our delegation that a committee's charter is embodied in the mandate adopted by the Conference. Clearly, that is what is contemplated by the Conference on Disarmament's rules of procedure. When it was suggested two years ago that the President make a statement following adoption of the outer space mandate, our delegation reluctantly agreed. We agreed because we consider that a President is entitled to state his personal views, and such views in no way affect the mandate or the work of any committee. We agreed reluctantly because we were concerned that others might make more of such a statement than was warranted.

Unfortunately, that is what happened in 1987. Several delegations treated the President's statement as a substantive addition to, and extension of, the mandate, and much committee time was wasted debating the relevance of the statement. The presidential statement was later misused in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. When the issue of a presidential statement again was raised at the beginning of the 1988 Conference on Disarmament session, our delegation at that time pointed out these abuses and, hoping that our protestations had registered, we again reluctantly agreed, stressing that the presidential statement should not be elevated to greater stature than it deserved, that is, that it should be treated as an expression of the views of one delegate only. The Committee was formed and the presidential statement was delivered, and the sound of the gavel was still echoing through the chamber when other delegations began citing the presidential statement as authority for emphasizing some parts of the Committee's work programme at the expense of other parts.

This past experience convinces us that a negotiated presidential statement in conjunction with the outer space mandate leads to unacceptable perversion of the Conference on Disarmament's rules of procedure. It leads to misunderstandings. It leads to the waste of time, so for these reasons our delegation was opposed to a negotiated presidential statement this year. Of course, we continue to support the President's prerogative to express his own views, just as other Conference on Disarmament members and groups of delegations have the right to express their positions at all times.

Our delegation has joined consensus on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, with a mandate which will permit wide-ranging inquiry and valuable, interesting work, and we look forward to beginning that work at an early date under the able chairmanship of a distinguished Ambassador and our colleague, Ambassador Bayart.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Friedersdorf for his statement. May I ask if there is any other representative who wishes to take the floor? There seems to be none.

I thank you all for your understanding and co-operation in dispensing with the informal plenary before we proceeded to take decisions related to agenda item 5. I wish to say that this does not constitute a precedent for such decisions in the future. Before taking similar decisions in the future, I will consult with you through your co-ordinators to establish whether we can dispense with informal meetings.

I shall now invite the Conference to consider the timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, this timetable is merely indicative and we can proceed to adjust it, depending on the requirements of our work. You will notice that provision is made in the timetable for the opening meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, on Tuesday, 14 March at 3 p.m. in this conference room. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference accepts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for today, and I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 14 March at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.55 a.m.



CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.494
14 March 1989

ENGLISH

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 14 March 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Chusei Yamada (Japan)

GE.89-60443/0036a

The PRESIDENT: The 494th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

Twenty-seven years ago today, on 14 March, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum which has been meeting without interruption since then held its first plenary meeting at the Foreign Minister level. Known at the beginning as the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, it was later renamed Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Its procedural and organizational arrangements were certainly different from those which guide our work at present. Yet it was, at that time, a welcome development after almost two years without multilateral negotiations on disarmament.

During those 27 years, several important multilateral disarmament agreements have been negotiated here in Geneva - the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Sea-bed Treaty, the Convention banning biological and toxin weapons and the Convention on environmental modification for hostile purposes. The ENDC also contributed significantly to the conclusion, in 1963, of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. These agreements, together with others also negotiated in multilateral forums, such as the Antarctic Treaty, the outer space Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, represent a substantial body of international law in the field of disarmament. Together with bilateral agreements reached by the two big Powers and other nations, they perform the essential function of excluding certain areas, arms or activities from the arms race. However, it is clear that we are far from having succeeded in either stopping or reversing it.

Much remains to be done at all levels, and we, the members of the Conference on Disarmament and the non-members participating in it, have a heavy responsibility in advancing our negotiations to achieve new effective and verifiable disarmament measures. That responsibility assumes particular relevance at present, when the international situation shows considerable improvement and multilateral forums are proving once more that they are indispensable instruments in the search for disarmament. Clear indications in that respect appeared at the last regular session of the General Assembly. The success of the Paris Conference in recognizing the importance and continuing validity of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, as well as in providing further impetus to our negotiations on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban, is a timely example of the irreplaceable role of the multilateral approach to disarmament. Last but not least, this year we have welcomed in our midst an unprecedented number of non-member States wishing to participate in the work of the Conference. Twenty-four States have been invited to join us in dealing with the issues facing this multilateral body.

The 1989 session of the Conference has begun on a positive note. A number of organizational questions have been settled quickly. Five subsidiary bodies are working under their competent chairmen and, as requested by the Paris Conference, the Conference is redoubling its efforts in the field of chemical weapons. However, we should not forget that several agenda items and other subjects still need to find an appropriate organizational framework for

(The President)

their consideration. This applies in particular to the nuclear issues on our agenda, agenda items 1 to 3. Among those, I would like to single out agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", on which we have not been able, unfortunately, to find an acceptable arrangement since the end of 1983. I have initiated with our co-ordinators the process of exploring possible progress on the item, and I am very encouraged by the positive response. I assure you that I will continue to intensify my consultations and to co-operate with you in the search for a solution to those pending matters.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference starts today its consideration of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". However, in accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today the representative of Indonesia. I now call upon Ambassador Loeis.

Mr. LOEIS (Indonesia): It is indeed a pleasure for me and my delegation to see you, Sir, a personal friend and a representative of Japan, with which my country enjoys an excellent relationship, presiding over the deliberations of the Conference for the month of March. You may rest assured that the Indonesian delegation will extend its fullest co-operation to you in the discharge of your duties. My delegation also wishes to reiterate its appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Pugliese, for the commendable stewardship that he gave to our Conference last month.

Ideally, every year the Conference should end its deliberation on organizational matters in the month of February, and intensive negotiations should have begun in the month of March on substantive issues pertaining to all items on its agenda. The fact that the Conference is still not able to begin negotiation on its priority agenda items, such as the nuclear test ban, should be a source of deep concern, especially at a time when enthusiasm for disarmament and co-operation is on the rise. Now that the Conference is already in the midst of its spring session, I wish to join others in making some brief remarks on the subject.

Seven years ago, under the chairmanship of your delegation and with the help of Ambassador Jaipal, the then Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament, the Committee was successful in establishing a subsidiary body on the nuclear test ban with a mandate acceptable to all delegations. That success was achieved at a time quite different from now, marked by the intensified arms race and confrontation. Logically, the present political climate should have made it easier for the Conference to achieve a consensus. Unfortunately, such was not the case, and it would perhaps be too much to hope that the Conference could repeat that success during this spring session, as we are now almost in the second half of the month of March. Nevertheless, even at the risk that it may perhaps sound pointless, but given the highest importance attached by my delegation, as well as by your own, to the need to end nuclear testing once and for all, I would like to reiterate the appeal for the demonstration of "political will" from all sides so that the Conference can fully discharge its responsibility to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty as soon as possible. I am fully convinced that until such a treaty is concluded, this appeal, which has been made by many in the past, will be repeated again in the future.

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

Much has been said concerning the importance of having a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is the litmus test of nations' willingness to stop and reverse the nuclear arms race and move towards general and complete disarmament, which, according to paragraph 111 of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, will permit States to have at their disposal only non-nuclear forces. We are told that there is no such thing as peaceful nuclear explosions, and thus article V of the 1968 non-proliferation Treaty, which provides the basis for international co-operation in sharing the benefits stemming from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, has become a dead letter. From this premise a conclusion can accordingly be drawn that the continuation of nuclear testing is tantamount to permitting the continuation of the proliferation of nuclear weapons either quantitatively or qualitatively, or even perhaps for the purpose of inventing a new generation of weapons. If such is the case, the continuation of nuclear testing, and the refusal to continue negotiations to ban such testing, run counter, if not to the letter, at least to the spirit of the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty as well as the 1968 non-proliferation Treaty. As we can see, the nuclear test-ban treaty is not only important to end testing itself, but also has wider implications for the disarmament process as a whole. It is for these reasons that Indonesia, together with Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia and Venezuela, has proposed amending the parial test-ban Treaty to make it a comprehensive one.

As far as Indonesia is concerned, we gave up our nuclear options 19 years ago by signing the NPT. Indonesia has agreed since the very beginning of the existence of the Conference to make a nuclear test ban a priority and the first item on the agenda of the Conference. Consequently, my delegation is ready to establish the necessary subsidiary body with the responsibility of concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of urgency. The Indonesian delegation has also approached the "mandate problem" with a sufficient degree of flexibility. Although we are ready to embark on a full-fledged negotiation to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty, we none the less supported the mandate contained in document CD/291 in 1982, which accommodated the wishes of those who were not ready to negotiate. As we all know, it was with this mandate that the subsidiary body was established and discussed specific issues - verification and compliance - with a view to making further progress toward a nuclear test ban.

Today, it is very clear that the problem of verification is not the insurmountable obstacle it was pictured to be. To put it more succinctly, verification of compliance is possible, and the so-called problem of on-site inspection has become a matter of the past. With these developments and within the prevailing international political environment, the Conference should have been able to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty or at least work on the basis of the mandate contained in document CD/829, which my delegation believes is sufficient to accommodate those who are still not able to carry out a full-fledged negotiation.

My delegation is ready to co-operate and find a way out of the current impasse, and search for a mandate which provides a sound basis for well-structured deliberations where the result will be recorded in a formal document ensuring continuity and consistency of efforts towards the conclusion

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Any mandate which is less than that, I am afraid, may inadvertently compromise the prestige of this Conference as a negotiating body, converting it into just another round-table seminar. I am convinced that none of us would wish that to happen.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia for his statement, and for the very kind words he addressed to me and to my country. I have no other speakers on my list for today. May I ask whether any other delegation wishes to take the floor at this stage? There seems to be none.

Today, on behalf of the Conference, I would like to bid farewell to an esteemed and competent colleague - present at this plenary meeting - who is leaving us this week after seven years of hard and effective work in the Conference, although his country is not yet one of its members. I refer to Mr. Sten Lundbo, who will shortly take up the important post of Deputy Director-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo. His dedication and diplomatic skills are an example of how influential and full of opportunities the activities of a non-member can be. On behalf of the Conference, I wish him and his wife every success. In my capacity as Japanese delegate, I hope that the day will come soon when his country will join this Conference as a full member.

As I have no other business for today, I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 16 March, at 10.a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.30 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.495
16 March 1989

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 16 March 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Chusei Yamada (Japan)

GE.89-60463/0395B

The PRESIDENT: The 495th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is now called to order.

At the outset, I should like to extend a cordial welcome to His Excellency Ambassador Aarno Karhilo, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, who is addressing this plenary meeting. In doing so, I should like to recall that he made a significant contribution to the success of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons as an Acting Chairman of the Committee of the Whole. I should also like to note the long-time active participation and valuable contribution of Finland, a non-member, in the work of the Conference. I am sure that the members will follow the statement of His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State with particular interest.

The Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". In conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Finland, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Sri Lanka and Romania. The first speaker on my list is the representative of Finland. I invite His Excellency Ambassador Aarno Karhilo, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to address the Conference.

Mr. KARHILO (Finland): Mr. President, permit me to thank you for the warm words of welcome you have just extended to me. I am very pleased and honoured to have this opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament. Let me also express my pleasure at seeing you occupy the Chair of the Conference. I know that under your competent guidance, the Conference will work effectively.

Chemical disarmament has gained new urgency on the agenda of the world community. Alarm at the proliferation and use of chemical weapons is global. The 149 participating States at the Paris Conference in January aired their common awareness of this danger. It marked a unique expression of political resolve by virtually all States of the world. The Declaration of the Paris Conference called upon the Conference on Disarmament to conclude the convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons by redoubling its efforts on this issue. The present global alarm now provides a momentum which this negotiating body should not fail to seize. If this Conference succeeds in these efforts, it will give a new impetus for multilateral disarmament as a whole.

There is now an increasing understanding of the scope of the chemical weapons problem. Many countries are taking measures to strengthen export controls on chemicals, equipment and facilities which may be used in the production of chemical weapons. International trade in this kind of merchandise has to be put under scrutiny. But this alone is not enough to stop the spread of chemical weapons. Finland welcomes the Soviet Union's announcement at the Paris Conference that she will unilaterally start the elimination of her chemical weapon stockpiles. We also welcome the recent

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

statement by the United States that she plans to explore ways of ensuring the accelerated withdrawal of her chemical weapon stockpile from the Federal Republic of Germany.

These kinds of unilateral measures are encouraging signs. They help to strengthen the momentum which is further highlighted by developments in other areas of disarmament efforts. The Soviet Union and the United States are expected soon to resume their nuclear and space talks. Deep reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals will be a vital element in making the world safer. In Europe, two parallel sets of negotiations on military security within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe started only a week ago. In addition to the continued work on confidence- and security-building measures, conventional armed forces in Europe have finally become an object of negotiation.

Disarmament at the bilateral level and in the regional context is advancing. The Conference on Disarmament is responsible for advancement at the multilateral level. Among the first priorities is the completion of the chemical weapons convention. The Paris Conference demonstrated the globality of the chemical weapons question. The effectiveness of the future convention requires universal adherence to the convention from the very beginning. Every country is expected to abide by the provisions of the convention and, therefore, every country that is willing to contribute to the negotiations should have an opportunity to do so. Finland welcomes the decision of the Conference to open its Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to new observer States. The restructuring of the work of the Committee is a positive sign that the redoubling of efforts is taking place. We wish the Ad hoc Committee and its Chairman, Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, every success in turning the unanimous message of the Paris Conference into reality.

Verification of the future convention is undoubtedly one of the most difficult issues facing the CW negotiations. The Finnish research project on the verification of chemical disarmament - Finland's contribution to the CW negotiations - has for 15 years developed sensitive and selective analytical methods to meet verification requirements of the convention. The results have been published annually here at the Conference on Disarament in the form of "Finnish Blue Books" totalling about 2,500 pages of research data in 13 volumes. These reports contain analytical data on chemical warfare agents, their precursors and degradation products studied using seven instrumental methods. Some of the methods require sophisticated stationary instrumention, but some are also usable in mobile laboratories. Application of the methods for air monitoring was found feasible in on-site, near-site and remote verification tasks.

To make the results more readily available for other laboratories, a computerized verification data base is being prepared. A prototype of this data base was introduced at this Conference last year, and delegations were encouraged to test it by allowing them access to our computer. The ultimate goal is a comprehensive chemical weapons verification data base for the Technical Secretariat. In the first phase, an analytical data base will help the future Preparatory Commission in developing verification methods. We hope to be able to demonstrate its use to the delegations in Geneva during the coming summer session.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

To allow reliable use of the identification data collected into the data base, work within the project has proceeded to describe the numerous methods of sample preparation and analysis required in a way which meets the criteria of standard operating procedures. Concrete international co-operation is vital to the success of the pioneering work towards the standardization of methods. We are pleased to announce to this Conference that we have recently signed an agreement with Switzerland on co-operation in methods development. We are confident that our project will benefit from Swiss scientific expertise.

In order to facilitate international validation of the procedures the Finnish project is planning an inter-laboratory "round robin" exercise. The project will also test the suitability of the methods during the first trial inspection in Finland, which incidentally is taking place today.

Finland has put her capability to verify alleged uses of chemical weapons at the disposal of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Once the convention has been signed, Finland is also prepared to offer the facilities of her research project to the Technical Secretariat for analytical work. Continuous methods development and updating of chemicals lists will remain important after the convention has entered into force.

In addressing the Paris Conference, Foreign Minister Kalevi Sorsa announced that, as of next year, Finland is prepared to train each year, free of charge, chemists from the developing world in the use of technical methods and instruments relevant to the verification tasks of the convention. Details of this offer will be worked out before the summer, and invitations will be extended directly to the Governments concerned. Close acquaintance with the technical methods is necessary for every party to the convention that has a chemical industry of its own. National organizations should be able to ensure compliance with the obligations set out in the convention. Acquaintance with the methods would also facilitate the recruitment of staff to the Technical Secretariat on a broad geographical basis.

Let me now turn to another major item on the agenda of this Conference, that is nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. The role of nuclear weapons is being reappraised. The complete prohibition of nuclear tests would be necessary to constrain the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. A cessation of nuclear testing would also strengthen the non-proliferation Treaty, addressing the danger of the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. Finland looks forward to the fourth review conference of the NPT next year. We hope that it will allow further steps to strengthen the status of the Treaty as one of the corner-stones of international security. Progress in nuclear test-ban negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States as well as in this body would facilitate the success of the NPT review conference.

Again, progress towards reliable and effective verification is a prerequisite for the success of the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. The Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (GSE), working under the auspices of the Conference since 1976, has a key role in this respect. In order to make a contribution to the study and development of effective seismic verification methods for a test ban, Finland is actively participating in the

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

work of the GSE and maintains for the purpose a seismic verification research programme run by the University of Helsinki and sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Finnish participation is made possible by a sophisticated national network of seismic stations and the requisite expertise. Moreover, the bedrock in Finland offers optimal conditions for seismic detection. With a view to the improved global seismic data exchange system to be presented in the fifth report of the GSE, Finland is completing her own facilities in the framework of her seismic verification research programme.

A new three-component station (VAF) equipped with modern instrumentation designed specially for detection purposes will start operations this spring in western Finland. This station, together with the array station FINSA, with continuous seismic data transmission to the national data centre in Helsinki, are the main elements offered to the global seismic data exchange system to be established for monitoring of a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests.

In addition to this system Finland is participating in co-operation with Norway in a small-aperture seismic array experiment with the FINESA station in southern Finland. A new central computer unit and a continuous on-line data transmission system are to be brought into operation this spring, after which we will be ready to continue experimenting with other small-aperture arrays.

Finland welcomes the plans for large-scale experimental testing of the global seismic data exchange system (GSETT-2) in 1990. Finland is participating actively in the programme for this experiment and its start-up tests. As our contribution to GSETT-2, the computing facilities at the Finnish National Seismic Data Centre in Helsinki have been increased by adding new Sun computers and work stations for receiving, processing and transmitting seismic wave-form and parameter data. At the same time research is going on at the Helsinki NDC on procedures for automatic detection of seismic events. Some preliminary achievements of these studies have been presented at the ongoing GSE meeting.

Particular attention has been given to developing facilities for data transmission so that the seismic data recorded and processed within the Finnish station network can be made available to all interested parties. From the Helsinki NDC the seismic data can easily be transmitted through public networks to other data centres.

Seismic verification facilities are not equally distributed round the globe; in the southern hemisphere the density of seismograph stations is much lower than in the northern hemisphere. In order to improve seismic recording facilities in Africa, Finland has co-operated with Zambia in establishing a seismic network. The main station in Lusaka has the capacity to record, analyse and transmit seismic data, especially from the southern hemisphere, as is indicated by Zambian participation in GSETT-1 in 1984.

In order to strengthen the seismic observation capacity in Africa, Finland, in co-operation with UNESCO and various scientific organizations, conducted a training course for African seismological observers in Lusaka last September. Altogether 32 participants from 15 African countries took part in

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

this course. To encourage African countries to participate in the work of GSE, including GSETT-2, the Finnish Government is prepared to increase assistance to the Lusaka seismograph station.

The easing of international tensions, co-operation between major Powers and prospects for the peaceful settlement of many regional conflicts may encourage this body to discuss, beside its substantive work, questions relating to its agenda, procedures and membership. As a non-member State Finland has repeatedly emphasized its continuing active interest in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Our contributions to multilateral disarmament efforts, some of which I have just presented to you, are a record of our commitment. As a neutral country Finland has a permanent interest in disarmament. It is our conviction that countries which are able and willing to participate should have the opportunity to do so fully.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency Ambassador Karhilo, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, for his statement. It was indeed a pleasure for me as a delegate of Japan to welcome you, Sir, who served in Tokyo as Ambassador of Finland and who are such a good friend of Japan. I would also like to thank Your Excellency for the very kind words you addressed to me.

Before I give the floor to the next speaker, I would like to welcome a group of students from Yugoslavia who are observing our session in the public gallery. I thank them for their interest in the work of disarmament, and wish them a very successful and fruitful visit. The next speaker is the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): First of all, Mr. President, allow me to convey to you my warm congratulations as you take up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March. I should like to express my appreciation to you, as the representative of a country with which the German Democratic Republic shares fruitful relations. I wish you success in the discharge of your responsible duties, and I can assure you of my delegation's fullest support in this endeavour. I am confident that under your able and efficient stewardship the Conference will yield concrete results in the negotiating process. Your predecessor, Ambassador Pugliese, deserves our appreciation and gratitude for his competence and special negotiating skills which helped create the necessary conditions for resuming our Conference's work.

I should like to introduce at today's plenary session document CD/899, i.e. the report on the national trial inspection of the German Democratic Republic.

In February 1988, the Soviet Union submitted a proposal for the holding of trial inspections in chemical industry facilities in order to expedite work on the draft convention on chemical weapons. This initiative was taken up and developed further by the Ad hoc Committee, resulting in document CD/CW/WP.213. On this basis, the German Democratic Republic carried out a trial inspection in an industrial plant in the autumn of 1988. It was conducted in a multi-purpose pharmaceutical facility, a production unit of the "Dresden" pharmaceutical enterprise, which processes a substance listed

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in schedule [2] as "To be discussed further" - dimethylaminoethanol. The substance is converted into meclophenoxate hydrochloride, a chemical which is used as a medicine.

In preparation for the trial inspection an initial visit - actually a sequence of several visits - was carried out. During the "initial visit period" a facility agreement was negotiated and a document outlining the detailed verification approach was drawn up. The initial visit included four one-day visits to the facility and several weeks for the analysis and study of basic documents to prepare the verification concept and negotiate the facility agreement. The routine verification lasted for two days, while the elaboration of the inspection report took one day.

The following inspection methods were applied: inventory controls by direct measurement, enumeration of standard tanks, verification of records and sampling and analyses for confirmation of data in the material balance declaration and of non-production of schedule [1] chemicals. At the same time, the operating condition and the production régime were checked on the basis of the facility agreement. Moreover, interviews were held with plant workers.

During the inspection two technical principles were investigated, namely material balance verification and anomaly detection. In the case of material balance verification, a narrow inspection mandate was drawn up and successfully implemented, based on the facility agreement and the verification approach. For anomaly detection, it was difficult to formulate a tight inspection mandate.

The facility was notified in advance of the inspection date, mainly because material balance verification, and inventory verification in particular, can only be performed at specific points in the production cycle. Therefore, the time of the inventory verification must be agreed with the operator of the facility, while interim inspections can be conducted at short notice in accordance with the "rolling text". The inspection did not have a major impact on facility operations. But with a view to making facility operations suitable for verification under the convention, some adjustments became necessary, both in facility accounting practice and in the operating régime at the facility. We are looking forward to expert discussions on the experience gathered during trial inspections, to be held in the coming weeks here in Geneva.

Since I have been given the floor, I should like to air some further observations on topical issues concerning current negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The verification problem has attracted great attention in recent consultations. Our delegation welcomes the efforts made in Working Group 1 with respect to the pattern of verification. A conclusion to be drawn from this debate is that the existing elements of verification included in the "rolling text" constitute a solid foundation for a functioning and reliable verification system. Chemicals which are chemical weapons and have little or no use except for CW purposes, as well as key components for binary or multicomponent chemical weapons, are covered under the most stringent régime.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

The second category, key precursors, will also fall under systematic verification by on-site inspection. In both cases, the inspections will have to prove not only that the chemical is not used for other than the declared purposes, but also the absence of any production prohibited by the convention in the facility under inspection. A third category of chemicals will be subject to verification by data monitoring.

At present the question of whether there is a need to supplement these verification system elements is being discussed. We feel that an answer to this question may be found in trying to identify the aim of additional verification measures. It will be easier to make a choice concerning the verification methods to be applied on the basis of this identification. One target for verification is chemicals which are not included in any of the three schedules and which, because of their toxicity or other characteristics, can be diverted to chemical weapons purposes. In addition, the facilities producing these chemicals might be converted into or readily used as CW production facilities. In our view, a solution could perhaps be brought about by including such chemicals in schedule [2]. In so doing, sufficient assurance could be obtained that the chemical in question is not produced for prohibited purposes and the facility not used for CW production. This relates to problems which have been the subject of discussion for some time under the heading "schedule [4]" or "super-toxic lethal chemicals" (STLCs). To arrive at the aforementioned solution, the guidelines for schedule [2] would have to be drafted to allow for the inclusion of such chemicals. The ambivalent characteristics of some chemicals, however, might create difficulties in reaching agreement on whether a specific chemical requires systematic verification or not. For these cases, another pragmatic approach seems to be advisable.

In our opinion it would be sensible for a list to be drawn up comprising those dubious chemicals which cause concern. Requests from States parties should form the basis of such a list, which should be compiled by the Technical Secretariat and communicated to the States parties. The idea of maintaining an open list of this kind was advanced by the delegation of Italy last year. The production of chemicals set forth in this list, probably above a certain threshold, as well as the facilities in which they are produced, would have to be declared by the States parties. Following such declarations, checks could be carried out on an ad hoc basis. The creation of weighting factors, as suggested by the Federal Republic of Germany, could serve as a means of choosing the proper frequency of ad hoc checks. The scientific council whose establishment was proposed by France could assume an advisory role in the overall process. By applying this method, only one point of possible concern would be left unaffected, namely facilities which do not produce chemicals contained in the schedules and are consequently not declared, but which have the capability of being used as or easily converted into a CW production facility. The discussions on this subject did not reveal any possibility of defining sufficiently clear characteristics so that they can be included in a list or a special register. We are ready to discuss further ideas to provide assurances regarding the absence of prohibited activities in such facilities. There is, of course, always the alternative of requesting a challenge inspection.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

Another problem I should like to touch upon concerns the Executive Council. We attach great importance to reaching agreement on the composition of the Executive Council of the future Organization. The work to be accomplished on this subject would, to our mind, also help make headway in other subjects which are linked with the functions of this organ. In working paper CD/812 of 4 March 1988, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic set forth its views on the composition, size and decision-making of the Executive Council. In this approach we proceeded from the fact that the proper implementation of the convention would have a strong bearing on the security interests of the States parties. For this reason, the stability of the convention and its global character will largely depend on the political body acting as the executive organ. The composition of the Executive Council will have to correspond to the character of the convention as a disarmament agreement. That is why its composition should be in accordance with the political balance established in the Conference on Disarmament, as the appropriate multilateral organ to negotiate this kind of agreement. Therefore, the conclusion has been drawn that the principles of political balance and equitable geographical distribution should play a crucial role. In addition, the groups should be made up of an appropriate number of countries with a developed chemical industry as well as those not having a major industry of this kind. We are still of the opinion that this organ, to be effective, should be composed of a limited membership. We deem the figure of 21 adequate.

Since we are now to continue the debate on these issues in the various working groups, I would like to offer some observations on the outcome of discussions held in the meantime. In our view they revealed that the relationship between political balance and equitable geographical distribution, being the governing principles for the composition of the Executive Council, was widely supported. A limited size for this body was also considered essential. Different views have been expressed only concerning whether the stage of development of a chemical industry should be taken into account. We arrived at these conclusions during the consultations held last year in the working group under the chairmanship of Mr. Numata of Japan. The same goes for observations offered on this subject in the plenary. I am referring especially, in this context, to statements made by the delegations of Brazil, France, Pakistan, the United States, Sweden and China last year. The quotations contained in the circulated text of my statement delivered today speak for themselves. 1/

1/ The relevant section of the text circulated by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic read as follows:

"The delegation of Brazil stated on 26 April 1988: 'Three criteria, in our view, could be merged in the definition of eligibility for the

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

I believe that this justifies the conviction that there already exists a foundation for elaborating an agreement in principle on the composition of the Executive Council. Following this agreement, the details of a text to be included in article VIII could then be worked out. We value the intention expressed by the Chairman of Working Group 3 to start consultations on this item, and we welcome the fact that this endeavour was also supported by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Morel of France.

Executive Council: geographical, political and industrial capacity.' The CD was proposed as a model for a 'strong, efficient and representative Executive Council, with a membership in the range between 20 and 30 ...' (CD/PV.460).

"The French delegation stressed in its statement of 17 March 1988 that the composition of the Executive Council should not be 'simply a copy of the usual rules in general political bodies'. The view was expressed that it is 'on the contrary, directly linked to the convention itself and so combines the geographical, the political and the industrial criteria' (CD/PV.449).

"In the statement of the delegation of Pakistan of 28 April 1988, it was stressed that the precise composition of the Executive Council 'should be based on the principles of equitable geographical distribution and of political balance' (CD/PV.461).

"We appreciate the positive comment made by the United States delegation in its statement of 14 April 1988 concerning our working paper CD/812. In this context, it was stated that 'the Executive Council must be small enough for effective work and yet represent the different interests involved in the convention'. The statement recognized that care must be taken to achieve political balance, and recommended that it should be brought about indirectly. The interrelationship between political balance and decision-making procedures was also stressed (CD/PV.457).

"In its statement of 13 September 1988, the delegation of Sweden expressed the following view: 'The composition of the Executive Council should reflect political balance and equitable geographical distribution.' It was further stated that the wish for special representation of countries carrying a higher burden of routine inspections was understandable (CD/PV.481).

"In its statement of 31 March 1988, the delegation of China recognized 'a convergence of views' on 'the three elements of geographical distribution, chemical industry capacity and political groupings'. We fully share the conviction expressed by China that 'so long as we give full consideration to the above three elements and show mutual compromise and understanding, a composition of the organization compatible with the requirements of the convention will be found' (CD/PV.453)."

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

Winding up my statement, I have grounds to reiterate on this occasion what has already been said at SSOD-III, during the Paris Conference, and here in this very room. The German Democratic Republic possesses no chemical weapons and has no such weapons from other States stationed on its territory. It is neither engaged in the development of chemical weapons, nor has it facilities to produce them. The German Democratic Republic advocates an international moratorium on the production of chemical weapons before the entry into force of the convention, and has introduced strict export controls for dual-purpose chemicals. My country continues its efforts towards the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe, because this, we feel, will facilitate a global solution.

These measures are truly building confidence. They add, we think, to the successful work of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. These steps, in fact, promote the early conclusion of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The German Democratic Republic is keeping its word given at the Paris Conference that it will advance these negotiations by displaying a constructive and action-oriented approach and submitting substantive proposals. Our delegation is in favour of focusing these negotiations on the essential issues of the CW convention and achieving a real breakthrough. We do this because the implementation of the Declaration of the Paris Conference will not come about on its own. We do this since concrete action is called for when we are about to seize the chance offered at the Paris Conference, namely to conclude the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons at the earliest date.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Dietze of the German Democratic Republic for his statement, and for the very kind words he addressed to me and to my country. The next speaker is the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vajnar.

Mr. VAJNAR (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, let me first of all cordially welcome you to the presidency of our Conference for the month of March. Your diplomatic skill and kind, flexible, personal approach has already influenced our proceedings positively. We wish you full success in your further work, and I assure you that you may rely on the full support and co-operation of our delegation. I would also like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Pugliese, for his useful work as the President of the Conference in February. Let me also join you in welcoming the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Ambassador Aarno Karhilo, who addressed the Conference this morning. We listened to his statement with great interest.

As I informed the Conference last month, Czechoslovakia carried out a national trial inspection of a chemical industry facility on 25 and 26 January this year. In my short intervention today I would like to introduce the report on this inspection, contained in what will be document CD/900.

The facility selected for the inspection is a medium-sized plant situated close to the town of Mnísek, producing an agent commercially designated as Spolapret OS which is used mainly for non-flammable treatment of cotton. This substance is produced from phosphorus trichloride, which is converted into

(Mr. Vajnar, Czechoslovakia)

dimethyl phosphite, these being substances which would under CD/881, be declared schedule [3] chemicals. For the purposes of the inspection these compounds were hypothetically considered as schedule [2] chemicals.

The inspection team was composed mainly of officials with a technical background. However, representatives from the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs also participated, either as members of the inspection team or as observers. The main sponsor of the trial inspection, the Ministry of Industry of the Czech Socialist Republic, paid thorough attention to the preparations for the experiment and to the establishment of all necessary conditions for its effective and instructive implementation. Special emphasis was placed on the thorough preparation of the facility attachment, since it soon became evident that the provisions included in the attachment would play an important "regulatory" role for the designation of areas or places to be inspected, as well as access by the inspectors and the conduct of the inspection itself.

The plant was visited six times between November 1988 and January 1989 before the facility attachment was finalized and concluded on 25 January. In its preparation maximum use was made of the provisions contained in the "Model for an agreement relating to facilities producing, processing, or consuming chemicals listed in schedule [2]" (CD/881, pp. 124-127). The inspection proper took two days. Its technical proceedings are described in detail in the report. The conclusions drawn from the inspection, which are specified in the report, might be summarized in the following way.

Firstly, the provisions relating to the verification of chemical industry facilities which have been developed so far in CD/881 can be considered as accurately reflecting the requirements for such verification. The national trial inspection convinces us that reliable verification of civilian chemical industry is feasible. At the same time, under normal conditions, the inspection is not exceedingly intrusive for the facility, or too demanding for the inspecting personnel, either in terms of participants or in terms of time. We hope that our experiment, together with the evaluation of other national trial inspections, will contribute to the completion of the verification provisions and procedures of the future chemical weapons convention.

Secondly, the participants in the inspection repeatedly realized the importance of the facility attachment. Attention paid to this kind of document in the previous work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has proved fully justified, since the facility attachment indeed plays the role of a "guide" to a facility, while at the same time protecting it from unnecessary intrusiveness and disclosures of confidential information. Two footnotes attached to the text of the Model on which facility attachments will be based indicate that some work on the material is still needed. We favour the initiation of such work as soon as possible.

Thirdly, the size of inspection teams will, in the course of real inspections, vary quite considerably, depending on the type of facility. It seems useful to envisage, in the case of larger inspection teams, specialization of its members. In view of the need to protect confidential information, the participants in the inspection came to the conclusion that access to all information should be limited to the head of the inspection team.

(Mr. Vajnar, Czechoslovakia)

Fourthly, certain conclusions, albeit only approximate ones, might be drawn with regard to time periods required for various operations. For instance, the elaboration and conclusion of a facility attachment will require about one week. The routine inspection itself could be carried out effectively within one or two days, depending on the type of facility inspected. The preparation of a final report on an inspection might take about five to seven days.

The first stage of the trial inspection of chemical industry, which I am speaking about, confirmed the timeliness and usefulness of the initiative on this matter advanced in February last year by the delegation of the USSR. As was said in the statement of the Government of Czechoslovakia issued on 5 January this year, we are prepared to participate in the second stage of the experiment, namely, inspections with the participation of international inspectors.

Allow me to add one short remark concerning our present proceedings. One of the valuable conclusions to be drawn from the experiment, as well as from the work of the spring session of the Conference on Disarmament to date, as far as the future work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is concerned, is that it should be as specific and as goal-oriented as possible. What we need is not the redrafting of essentially agreed provisions, while some important issues are still unsolved in the "rolling text". In our view a pragmatic approach would now require concentration of our effort on the solution of these outstanding problems. In this spirit of practical work Czechoslovakia is prepared to provide information on facilities, laboratories and other scientific institutions producing or handling chemicals of relevance to the convention. We could start releasing such information soon.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Vajnar of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me. The next speaker is the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Rodrigo.

Mr. RODRIGO (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, it is a great pleasure to see you presiding over the Conference this month. Sri Lanka has centuries-old ties with Japan and has an excellent relationship with your Government and people. That you are a personal friend and an able and wise diplomat well suited to preside over the Conference on Disarmament in this important month, makes it all the more a pleasure. I would also like to express my delegation's appreciation for the commendable leadership of Ambassador Aldo Pugliese over the Conference on Disarmament last month. Let me also welcome our guests, the student group from Yugoslavia who are with us today.

Dramatic developments have taken place in the recent past which logically should augur well for the work of the Conference on Disarmament. The INF agreement is well into the process of implementation under a verification régime that is unprecedented. The fear of negotiation has been overcome and has led to a bold new co-operative relationship between the super-Powers. This has gone a long way to calm the empty rancour of confrontation. In turn, this has rippled out to new agreed approaches by the super-Powers to certain regional issues, which has helped towards their solution or at least their

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

amelioration. A flow of exchanges has commenced, including on nuclear and outer space issues. Unilateral reductions by the Soviet Union and socialist countries in their armed forces have been mooted.

On the broader multilateral canvas, we have seen the culmination of the CSCE review and the commencement of negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, as well as the continuation of negotiations on confidence - and security-building measures, the latter with the participation of non-aligned and neutral States as well. There are also strong expectations of drastic reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals. Finally, in Paris in January this year 149 countries, by a remarkable act of consensus, together forged an unequivocal political commitment against chemical weapons and called on the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously remaining issues and to conclude the chemical weapons convention at the earliest date.

The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons was in many ways a product of the times, and the Government of France needs to be congratulated for articulating and vigorously pursuing an idea whose time had clearly come.

Some aspects about the Paris Conference require particular emphasis. Firstly, it was an endeavour in which 149 nations participated despite proclaimed differences in approach. In short, it was a genuine multilateral effort. Secondy, it was a multilateral exercise that ran simultaneously with ongoing efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to complete an effective ban on chemical weapons. It did not undermine, obstruct or complicate the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Indeed, Paris showed that a broad-based, multilateral and - this is significant - clearly political approach need not upset the highly specialized negotiating process continuing in the Conference on Disarmament. Finally, the consensus reached at the Paris Conference was hailed throughout the world as a manifestation of political determination and will to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them.

The strong political message thus emerging from Paris should have found a corresponding echo in the Conference on Disarmament's work. In fact, a task of the Paris Conference was to positively influence the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament's task in turn was to respond to the challenge offered by the Paris document. The Co-ordinator of the Group of 21, the representative of Kenya, has already expressed our concern that the Conference on Disarmament's mandate was not adjusted and strengthened in such a way as to reflect more fully the international will clearly articulated at the Paris Conference.

Much of the success of the Paris Conference was due to the patient preparatory work undertaken by the French delegation, particularly our colleague Ambassador Pierre Morel, who now deservedly steers the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. His thematic or conceptual approach to negotiations takes us beyond the specific individual provisions of the "rolling text" and helps to give a clear perspective of the inter-relationship of different articles and provisions. In this way the convention can be envisaged as a balanced and integrated package which meets the concerns

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

of all countries. At the same time we should be cautious about any over-conceptualization that might lead to a loss of focus and shift emphasis away from treaty-oriented negotiation.

Discussions in the Working Group on Verification should not lead to a point where the convention is called upon to legislate for every single eventuality. Such an approach could pose restrictive burdens on small chemical industries, particularly in developing countries. We have requested the relevant authorities in Sri Lanka to study how our small chemical industry could respond to a non-production verification régime.

We would like to commend the Chairman of Group 5 for his suggestions with regard to the question of assistance and protection. The provisions in the convention on the question of assistance, together with those for technological co-operation, will help ensure wider adherence. We would like the envisaged Organization to be more actively involved in the provision of assistance and protection. Availability of assistance to a victim State through the envisaged Organization would be a practical and indeed effective manifestation of collective political will that should serve to deter attacks with chemical weapons. Timely protective assistance is essential. Chemical weapons have been used mainly against those who do not have the requisite protective capability. Affected countries should have the confidence to seek security through the convention's protective régime rather than through dubious attempts to develop their own chemical weapons capability. It is in this context that we understand the emerging agreement on the relationship between protection, assistance and the concept of undiminished security. A dependence exclusively on voluntary assistance would not afford the same degree of security as would the availability and provision of assistance through de-politicized mechanisms under the Organization.

I would now like to make some brief remarks on item 1 of our agenda - Nuclear test ban. A quarter-century has passed since the signing of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (the partial test-ban Treaty - PTBT). The distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, in a statement made at the opening meeting of this spring session, surveyed international efforts spread over three decades in pursuit of multilateral negotiations to achieve a total ban on nuclear testing. It is a matter of regret that negotiations have not taken place since 1980 on this vital question, and that the intermittent work of the Conference on Disarmament within the framework of a subsidiary body during 1982-1983 was inconclusive.

The 1963 partial test-ban Treaty was conceived essentially as an interim measure in the process leading to a comprehensive test ban. The test ban itself, in turn, was placed in the overall context of "the principal aim of general and complete disarmament". Five years later, in a related move, the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty was signed. Its preamble recalls the determination expressed by the parties to the 1963 PTBT "to seek ... discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end".

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

Sri Lanka became a party to the NPT in the expectation that the Treaty would enhance the security of all States and contribute to international peace and security. A commitment to negotiate a total ban on nuclear testing was an integral part of the NPT consensus. Continued testing has been rationalized on various grounds. Test explosions are said to be necessary, inter alia, to refine and sophisticate weapon designs, to ensure the enduring reliability of stockpiled weapons and to guarantee their safety. Technical studies have, however, indicated that all these functions can be as effectively fulfilled without recourse to actual test explosions. However, the most important argument advanced by those advocating continued testing is of course that it is required to modernize and improve the lethality and accuracy of nuclear missiles and weapons systems so as to maintain that illusory "edge" over those of rivals.

The Foreign Minister of the USSR, Mr. Shevardnadze, stated in Vienna this year that "nuclear missile modernization is a step backward, not forward". The refinement of weapons increases the threat to the security of all nations and is a major obstacle to the pursuit of disarmament measures. The United States-Soviet bilateral talks on nuclear testing, though welcome per se as confidence-building measures, concentrate on regulating rather than eliminating testing. Moreover, bilateral talks of this nature, despite their undoubted scope, do not fully encompass the question of continued testing by other nuclear-weapon States. The imperative for a comprehensive test-ban treaty has been ackowledged and, as stated before, is embodied at least in spirit in the PTBT and the NPT, as well as in the Final Document of SSOD-I.

An unfortunate impasse has prevented the Conference on Disarmament from negotiating on item 1 of its agenda. There are indeed a number of proposals on the table to help finalize an adequate mandate for an ad hoc committee to commence substantive work on this item. While my own delegation has no rigid attitude, we would of course prefer the proposal of the Group of 21 in document CD/829, which does have some flexibility to facilitate a consensus that would meet the concerns of those who are wary about negotiating a treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. The desire to get over this impasse in the Conference on Disarmament has led to the consideration of other measures as well. Such measures have been pursued without in any way seeking to duplicate the mandate and functions of the Conference on Disarmament or to question its central role in multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. Attention has been given to utilizing the provisions of article II of the PTBT, which contains provision for the consideration and possible adoption of amendments to the Treaty through a conference of parties.

Following an initiative by the delegations of Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and my own delegation, action has been set in motion for the convening of a conference of treaty parties to consider an amendment proposal that would convert the PTBT into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The requisite number of signatures requesing a conference has I believe been obtained. The supporters of the amendment proposal see it more as a possible spur to the stalled work on the test ban in the Conference on Disarmament than an attempt to usurp its central function in multilateral negotiations. To illustrate this approach, one needs only to consider the acknowledged impact of the Paris Conference of January this year on the work of the Conference on Disarmament relating to the chemical weapons convention.

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

An amendment conference would provide for a cross-pollination of differing approaches towards the fulfilment of the original promise held out in the preamble of the PTBT, which was to seek the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. An eventual comprehensive test ban would also have a major impact on every aspect of nuclear disarmament and impose restrictions on the qualitative arms race and the development of new weapons systems, which would in turn contribute to creating a climate of greater confidence and security. Furthermore, the significance of an amendment conference in which would participate a number of States which are not parties to the NPT régime would be that a more favourable atmosphere would be created for its review Conference next year, and thereafter possibly for the renewal and the continuance of the NPT beyond 1995.

Finally, my delegation is glad that the Ad hoc Committee on outer space has been established. We regret that a bout of procedural wrangling is holding up substantive work. We are hopeful that the Chairman of the Committee will be successful in his negotiations. My delegation will revert to the subject of outer space in a later intervention.

In closing, I would like on behalf of my delegation to extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Reese of Australia, Ambassador Houllez of Belgium, Ambassador Dietze of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Sharma of India, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan and Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Rodrigo of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me and to my country. The next speaker is the representative of Romania, Ambassador Dolgu.

Mr. DOLGU (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. President, since I am taking the floor in plenary for the first time since the beginning of this month of March, permit me to extend to you our warmest congratulations on the occasion of your taking up the presidency of the Conference. Our wishes go to the distinguished representative of Japan, your great country, to the patient and skilled diplomat with whom we are familiar as well as to a colleague and friend of outstanding intellectual and human qualities. Through you, Sir, I would also like to extend our thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, and thank him very much indeed for his substantial and able efforts during the month of February to start up the work of the session. I too would like to welcome among us His Excellency, Ambassador Aamo Karhilo, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, and tell him how interested we were in his statement.

In my statement in plenary on 16 February 1989 I presented some views of a general nature on the status of the disarmament negotiations and major problems therein, as well as possible areas for action in the context of the Conference on Disarmament. On that occasion I stressed the importance of an integrated approach to disarmament, a comprehensive disarmament programme focused on nuclear disarmament and also including measures for the elimination of chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as measures to bring about a substantial reduction in conventional weapons, military personnel and military budgets.

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

Today, with your permission, I would like to make a few brief comments on problems covered by the first three agenda items on the Conference's agenda. In our view, nuclear disarmament remains an issue of the highest priority. The debates at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the resolutions adopted by the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, the realities and indeed the imperatives of interantional life oblige the Conference and all member States to act responsibly to discharge this urgent priority task. With respect to item 1 on our agenda, we reiterate our appeal for the immediate cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests and for the initiation of negotiations on an agreement for a halt to the refinement of such weapons, with universal participation. As has already been stressed here, the international community should not allow the progressive development of nuclear weapons and the continuance of tests of such weapons to undermine the credibility of the non-proliferation Treaty. If nuclear-weapon testing continues, there is every reason to fear that the qualitative nuclear arms race will prevail over agreements concluded or currently being negotiated on the reduction of such weapons. Nor can it be forgotten that nuclear tests lead straight to a new generation of weapons. And one should not forget, in the euphoria of the various advances in the field of verification, which are most certainly to be welcomed, that the deadly threat which continues to hang over the very existence of mankind stems first and foremost from nuclear weapons.

We would like to take the opportunity once again to stress the importance of the initiative for the amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water in order to extend it to the underground environment, where tests are currently carried out. We have never accepted the legitimacy of nuclear weapons, nor the jutifications - of whatever kind - on which they may rest. And we do not think that in recent developments there have been any changes that would lead us to modify our attitude. On the contrary, in view of what has occurred, we find the monopoly of a few countries over nuclear weapons and the efforts some of them are making to hang on to this monopoly and strenghten it even less acceptable. How can one continue to claim that a serious disarmament effort is underway when the sole United Nations multilateral negotiating forum is denied even the opportunity to discuss problems relating to nuclear weapons. The USSR and the United States of America have a special responsiblity in the field of disarmament, and they should be encouraged to pursue their bilateral nuclear arms reduction efforts. These efforts and the results therefrom are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a real, sustained and global disarmament process. They should not and cannot replace multilateral efforts by member States of the Conference on Disarmament and the international community as a whole. For the existence of nuclear weapons, their effects and also the impact of agreements for their reduction concern all countries. In this context I would like to remind you of our proposal of a universal treaty on the prohibition and complete step-by-step elimination of nuclear weapons and the creation of a special body with the particiation of all the nuclear Powers, as well as other States, to negotiate such a treaty. The least that can be hoped is that the search will go on for an adequate framework for substantive consideration of item 2 of our agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", as well as item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

Lastly, we would like to take this opportunity to underscore the importance of the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, and the need to make substantial progress in this area, in particular bearing in mind the fourth conference to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Dolgu of Romania for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me and to my country. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this moment? There seems to be none.

May I now turn to another subject? The secretariat has circulated today the timetable for meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. In this connection, I should like to recall that Friday 24 and Monday 27 March are official holidays for the United Nations Office at Geneva and, accordingly, there will be no conference services available at that time. Therefore, our timetable for the coming week covers up to Thursday 23 March, the date on which we shall hold our regular plenary meeting. The plenary meeting will be followd immediately by a meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. This arrangement means that there will be no meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament on Thursday afternoon next week. In accordance with our practice, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if needed. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference agrees to the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 21 March 1989, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.496
21 March 1989

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 21 March 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Chusei Yamada (Japan)

GE.89-60496/0137a

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 496th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the beginning, may I welcome, on behalf of the Conference, the new head of the delegation of Kenya, His Excellency Ambassador Simon Bullut, who is attending this plenary meeting. Ambassador Bullut has been appointed by his Government to that important position and entrusted with the responsibility of presiding over the Conference during the month of April. In welcoming him, I should also like to pledge to our new colleague the co-operation of the Japanese delegation, in particular when he assumes the responsibilities of the presidency next month.

The Conference begins today its consideration of agenda item 4, entitled "Chemical weapons". Nevertheless, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius.

Mr. HYLTENIUS (Sweden): I have asked for the floor today to speak on the item which in the view of my Government is the most important on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, that is the question of a nuclear test ban. However, before doing so, Mr. President, I should like to express the pleasure of my delegation at seeing you presiding over the Conference. With your personal skill, experience and commitment, the Conference is in very competent hands. It is a crucial month, not least when it comes to the question of the nuclear test ban, and I know that you are making great and constructive efforts to deal with this important matter. I also wish to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Pugliese for the excellent manner in which he conducted his task in the month of February. As I am speaking for the first time before the CD in my new capacity, I should like to thank all those colleagues who have welcomed me and assure them that I look forward to co-operating with them in the future.

For many years now the General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted, with overwhelming majorities, resolutions regarding the urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, reaffirming the particular responsibility of this Conference in the negotiation of such a treaty It is a source of grave concern to my Government that the Conference has not been able to move forward on this momentous question. On the political level a comprehensive test-ban treaty would have a tremendous impact. Already the commencement of multilateral negotiations on such a treaty after so many years of stalemate on the item in the Conference would constitute a considerable step forward in the field of disarmament.

The importance of bringing an end to nuclear testing was acknowledged by three of the nuclear-weapon States in the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963. More than a quarter of a century ago they undertook to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and expressed their determination to continue negotiations to that end. Further, in the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 they undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date. It is hard to conceive of any measure more conducive

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

to the cessation of the nuclear arms race than a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is appropriate to recall this in view of the forthcoming NPT review conference in 1990.

The Swedish Government considers that the non-proliferation Treaty is of pivotal importance, and that every effort must be made to sustain and strengthen that Treaty. The non-nuclear-weapon parties have done their share, but the nuclear-weapon Powers must do more to live up to the spirit of the Treaty, and especially its article VI. My delegation is convinced that a nuclear test ban would not only hamper vertical nuclear proliferation, but also strongly promote efforts to prevent the horizontal spread of these weapons. Continued vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons may endanger the future of the non-proliferation régime.

It is a positive development that the two leading nuclear-weapon Powers have engaged in bilateral talks on nuclear testing, but it is not enough. This is a matter that concerns all nations, and it should therefore be dealt with in a truly multilateral body. That forum is at hand, but so far the necessary political will to let it assume its responsibility is lacking. In the meantime the nuclear testing continues. Last year 38 nuclear explosions were conducted, 12 by the United States, 17 by the Soviet Union, 8 by France and 1 by China. Since nuclear testing significantly contributes to sustaining the nuclear arms race, partial or gradual approaches implying continued testing cannot be accepted by the great majority of States. In the view of my delegation, such approaches are acceptable only when directly linked to the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty at an early and specified date.

It has been stated that a nuclear test ban should be considered a long-term goal only, and that it is more urgent to reduce nuclear-weapon arsenals. However, a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests would not only be the single most important step to slow down the qualitative arms race in this field and prevent the emergence of new nuclear-weapon Powers. It would also be a valuable complement to reductions in nuclear arsenals, as agreed quantitative cuts stand the risk of becoming offset by qualitative improvements. In fact, a comprehensive nuclear test ban would be instrumental in avoiding such a development. Thus, bilateral and multilateral action on arms reductions and disarmament can complement and mutually reinforce each other.

It goes without saying that in order to be effective, a nuclear test-ban treaty must be of global scope. It must also be adequately verifiable. It is a political question to define what capacities should be considered necessary for adequate verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. For several years it was argued that the absence of appropriate verification methods constituted the main obstacle in the realization of a nuclear test ban. However, technical developments have now made it possible to meet far-reaching verification requirements. Verification has therefore become a political rather than a technical issue.

The Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events has just concluded

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

its twenty-seventh session. The new global seismic verification system emerging as a result of the work of the expert Group is based on the exchange of wave-form and parameter data and the processing of such data at international data centres. This system will provide participating States with a compilation of globally collected high-quality data that will greatly facilitate the verification of a test ban. The ongoing large-scale technical test, approved by the Conference on Disarmament, will allow evaluation of the system's performance. For a successful test and for the final design of the system, the co-operation and support of a large number of countries around the globe are essential.

It has been proposed that a global seismic monitoring system should be put into routine operation to gain experience from the operation of an international monitoring system and to demonstrate achievable capabilities. Once the ongoing redesign and testing of the new system is concluded, this could be an interesting possibility. In addition to the establishment of a global seismic monitoring system, complementary verification measures will be needed. It is essential to improve the verification capability in selected critical areas, such as test sites or areas containing cavities or low-coupling ground material, where the seismic signals from explosions will be substantially reduced.

By establishing seismic stations around test sites, weak explosions, even below one ton, can be detected. On-site inspections by international teams of observers would enhance confidence further. The monitoring of earthquakes within the nuclear-weapon States can be improved through the use of networks of internal seismic stations. Measures and procedures to ascertain the authenticity of data from these stations are essential. On-site inspection, conducted upon invitation, should be used to confirm that large chemical explosions, for instance in mining operations, are non-nuclear.

In its draft CTB treaty submitted in 1983, Sweden proposed that a global system for monitoring atmospheric radioactivity should be established in order to provide an assurance that clandestine explosions are not conducted in the atmosphere. We must not design a verification system which provides an assurance against clandestine underground tests but is less capable of detecting atmospheric explosions. Satellite images of the surface of the Earth can give valuable contributions to the verification of a nuclear test ban by monitoring the infrastructure and other evidence of nuclear testing in selected areas, for instance existing test sites and areas where peaceful nuclear explosions have been conducted. Satellite data could also assist in the interpretation of seismic events which have not been positively identified as earthquakes through seismic data alone. If satellite data show that an event is located in an area which lacks the infrastructure - roads, for instance - necessary to conduct a nuclear explosion, the possibility of a clandestine test might be excluded.

Many verification arrangements will be critically dependent on the global and secure exchange of information. This political need cannot be met by

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

commercial telecommunication services controlled by a limited number of countries. In this context, a recent Swedish study of a special telecommunications satellite system may be of particular interest. I am referring to an independent data exchange satellite system which could be established for the sole purpose of exchanging data related to arms limitation and disarmament treaties. It would not only provide a tool for the global exchange of verification data but also secure the authenticity of reported data. For the verification of a nuclear test-ban treaty, such a satellite system could facilitate special verification arrangements. It might be used for the direct and secure transfer of data from in-country monitoring stations and inspectors to international data centres, as well as to participating countries.

The Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts provides an excellent forum for the establishment of a high-quality international seismic verification system. It may also be suitable for some additional tasks related to the verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Expert deliberations are needed to pave the way for the implementation of such verification arrangements as on-site inspection and observation, the monitoring of airborne radioactivity and the use of satellite images for test ban verification. They give rise to technical and scientific questions similar to those presently addressed in connection with a global seismic system. My delegation, therefore, believes that it might be appropriate to ask the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to address these matters too.

The many efforts over the years to advance the nuclear test-ban issue in this Conference have hitherto been fruitless. Not even a mandate for an ad hoc committee has been agreed upon. My delegation finds the continued postponement of concrete work towards a nuclear test-ban treaty unacceptable. The efforts to elaborate different mandates in great detail have in fact created a stalemate in the Conference. Experience proves that a broad and far-reaching mandate sometimes yields only very modest results, while a comparatively weak mandate may be adequate to allow for considerable progress on substance.

During this session of the Conference several delegations from different groups have expressed flexibility as to the formulation of the mandate for an ad hoc committee. Whereas my delegation favours the mandate as recommended by the Group of 21 in CD/829, it also regards the compromise proposal in CD/863 as a viable approach, containing as it does a full commitment to a nuclear test-ban treaty. Given the impasse in the CD on the nuclear test-ban issue over the years, some States have requested that the matter should be dealt with through the convening of a conference to consider the amendment of the partial test-ban treaty. It is understandable that the frustration over the lack of progress in the CD has produced efforts to advance the issue elsewhere. My delegation, however, is of the opinion that it is in the Conference on Disarmament that the question should be dealt with. The CD is designated as the single multilateral body for disarmament negotiations. Action on the nuclear test ban must, therefore, be taken here, and now.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this moment? There seems to be none.

As there is no other business for today, I shall now adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 23 March, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.30 a.m.